

Recidivism and local peace and security: Toward policy recommendations for strengthening the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP)

Art Brian G. Rubio

artrubio20@gmail.com

Laguna State Polytechnic University, Sta. Cruz Campus, Laguna, Philippines, 4009

Abstract

This study examined the effectiveness of the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) in facilitating the reintegration of former rebel beneficiaries, reducing insurgency recidivism, and enhancing local peace and security. A descriptive-correlational research design was employed, with a quantitative survey administered to 87 former rebel beneficiaries. Quantitative data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation to determine relationships between reintegration factors like financial and livelihood assistance, psychosocial support, education and training, and community engagement, and outcomes such as insurgency recidivism and local peace and security. Findings show that E-CLIP effectively promotes holistic reintegration, with community support emerging as the most vital factor, highlighting the importance of social acceptance and active community involvement. Education and training are also highly valued, emphasizing the role of skills development in enhancing employability and independence. Financial and livelihood assistance, along with psychosocial services, are crucial for addressing economic and emotional needs, while sustained employment and monitoring mechanisms helped reduce insurgency recidivism. Although individual reintegration factors demonstrated weak direct statistical links to local peace and security, the combined effect of multidimensional interventions was found to significantly support reintegration outcomes. It is concluded that a coordinated, multifaceted approach that integrates financial, educational, psychosocial, and community-based interventions is essential to achieve sustainable reintegration, prevent relapse into armed conflict, and promote social cohesion. Policy recommendations include expanding vocational and educational programs, institutionalizing psychosocial support and trauma-informed care, maintaining livelihood assistance, encouraging structured community engagement, strengthening monitoring and evaluation, and fostering inter-agency collaboration. These measures are expected to enhance E-CLIP implementation, decrease insurgency recidivism, and improve local peace and security.

Keywords: Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program; reintegration; insurgency recidivism; local peace and security; psychosocial support; community engagement; vocational training; financial and livelihood assistance

1. Introduction

In many parts of the Philippines, especially CALABARZON (Region IV-A), insurgency and armed conflict continue to pose serious threats to peace and security. CALABARZON is the most populous region in the country, with 16,933,234 residents as of July 1, 2024, representing roughly 15.0% of the national population. The combination of community disengagement, persistent insurgency, and the growing need for reintegration programs underscores the need for data-driven, localized policy solutions. The challenge of providing efficient reintegration procedures for former rebels is not merely a concern of personal transformation but a critical issue affecting community resilience and regional security. Because of these implications, reintegration aligns closely with global development priorities such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly those advancing peace, inclusion, and sustainable livelihoods.

In response to the continuing insurgency problem, the government launched the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) to provide livelihood assistance, psychosocial support, education, skills training, and community reintegration services to former members of the Militia ng Bayan and the Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army – National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF). Official records show that more than 1,100 former rebels benefited from E-CLIP as of December 2022, while DILG IV-A granted financial aid to 45 former rebels in Quezon Province. Additionally, 88 barangays cleared of insurgency threats have been included in the Retooled Community Support Program (RCSP), an indication of the region’s proactive stance toward peacebuilding and community resilience.

These reintegration and community support efforts directly contribute to several SDGs: SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions) by promoting inclusive peace and reducing armed conflict; SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) through livelihood and economic reintegration; and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities) by addressing the marginalization of former rebels. The provision of training and education programs also aligns with SDG 4 (Quality Education), strengthening former rebels’ skills for future employment, while poverty-alleviation support connects to SDG 1 (No Poverty). Thus, E-CLIP is not only a national peace initiative but also a concrete local mechanism for advancing sustainable development.

Despite ongoing efforts, empirical evidence remains limited regarding how reintegration interventions under E-CLIP directly influence insurgency recidivism, particularly the likelihood of former rebels returning to armed conflict, and how these reintegration efforts contribute to broader local peace and security outcomes in CALABARZON. While studies have evaluated E-CLIP implementation in provinces like Sorsogon and Basilan, the specific dynamics within CALABARZON have not been extensively explored.

Moreover, existing research often focuses on program inputs and outputs, such as the number of beneficiaries or total financial assistance, rather than long-term outcome indicators like relapse into insurgency, community security improvements, or sustainability of reintegration. This gap underscores the need to analyze reintegration not only from a programmatic standpoint but also in terms of its long-term influence on peace, stability, and community well-being, which contribute to SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals) as multisectoral cooperation becomes vital in peacebuilding and local governance.

In the context of E-CLIP implementation under DILG IV-A, this study investigates the effects of reintegration on insurgency recidivism and local peace and security in CALABARZON. It examines how various reintegration interventions influence (a) the likelihood of former rebels returning to insurgency, and (b) the overall peace and order conditions in local communities within the region. Through this investigation, the study contributes to academic literature and policymaking by evaluating reintegration as a strategic instrument for sustainable peace in insurgency-affected areas.

The study specifically aims to determine how reintegration factors, such as financial assistance, psychosocial services, education and training, and community support, affect recidivism reduction and peace improvement; to assess the level of insurgency recidivism among beneficiaries; to measure local peace and security outcomes; and to examine the significant relationship between reintegration and both insurgency recidivism and peace and security indicators.

Ultimately, this research bridges the gap between the implementation of reintegration programs and measurable outcomes on recidivism and community stability. Its contribution is anchored in advancing long-term peace and development in CALABARZON, an area of strategic importance under the jurisdiction of DILG IV-A. By focusing on the program’s outcomes and their alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals, the study reinforces the importance of reintegration not only as a peace and security intervention but also as a transformative development strategy. The following chapters will review relevant literature, define key constructs such as reintegration, recidivism, and local peace and security, outline the research methodology, present the findings, and provide evidence-based policy recommendations to enhance E-CLIP implementation.

1.1. Background of the Study

One of the key internal security challenges affecting the Philippines' national development, local governance, and peacebuilding efforts is the ongoing insurgency. Insurgent groups, notably those led by the Communist Party of the Philippines New People's Army National Democratic Front (CPP NPA NDF), have persisted for over 50 years due to historical socioeconomic disparities, political marginalization, and ideological conflicts. Thanks to increased peace and development initiatives, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) report that the number of active NPA members nationwide has decreased from around 3,700 in 2016 to fewer than 1,800 in 2023 (AFP Annual Report, 2023).

Through Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2018-01, the Philippine government established the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP), led by the Department of National Defense (DND) and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), to complement military operations with socioeconomic measures. This program aims to assist former rebels in reintegrating into society by providing financial, livelihood, psychosocial, and educational support.

Reintegrating former rebels is essential to maintaining local peace and security in the CALABARZON region, which includes the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon. Forty-five (45) former rebels in Quezon Province received financial aid totaling more than ₱3.6 million in 2023 as a result of DILG IV-A's proactive implementation of the E-CLIP program (DILG CALABARZON, 2023). Additionally, the Retooled Community Support Program (RCSP), a supplementary effort to sustain peace gains and advance inclusive development, has cleared 88 barangays in the region of insurgency (Philippine Information Agency, 2024).

These events show that, despite being mostly urbanized, CALABARZON still needs ongoing peacebuilding efforts to stop violent conflict from returning. However, even with ongoing reintegration efforts, it is still necessary to evaluate whether these interventions have improved community perceptions of local peace and security and decreased insurgency recidivism, or the return of former rebels to insurgent activity.

The administrative and logistical components of E-CLIP implementation, such as the distribution of funds, the number of beneficiaries, and cooperation between local government units (LGUs) and national agencies, are the main focus of existing research and reports. However, only a small number of empirical studies have examined how reintegration affects former insurgents' conduct, socioeconomic reintegration, and recidivism prevention.

In many parts of the Philippines, particularly CALABARZON, where long-term peace increasingly rests not only on security operations but also on the successful reintegration of former rebels into mainstream society. Insurgency continues to be a chronic threat to sustainable peace and prosperity. To prevent former insurgents from returning to armed conflict and to improve local peace and security, programs such as the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) were created to address their socioeconomic, psychosocial, educational, and community-level needs.

However, evaluations of E-CLIP have mostly concentrated on program inputs and outputs, such as the quantity of aid given and the number of beneficiaries, rather than outcome-based indicators, such as improvements in community peace and security and insurgency recidivism, despite significant government investment. Policymakers and implementing agencies, especially the Department of the Interior and Local Government and local government units, are unable to identify the most successful and long-lasting reintegration programs due to this lack of empirical evidence.

Therefore, the purpose of this study is to empirically examine how key reintegration factors such as financial aid, livelihood support, psychosocial services, education and training, and community backing influence local peace and security as well as insurgent recidivism. The study highlights the importance of community acceptance, sustainable livelihoods, effective monitoring and aftercare, and strong local government support mechanisms by viewing reintegration as a strategic peace-building tool rather than

merely a humanitarian effort. The findings are expected to generate evidence-based policy recommendations that will improve the implementation of E-CLIP, shift program evaluation toward outcome-focused monitoring, and enhance the program's contribution to long-term peace, security, and community resilience.

1.2. Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored on the following theories:

Social Reintegration Theory posits that reintegration into society is a two-dimensional process involving structural reintegration, access to economic and institutional opportunities, and relational reintegration, such as acceptance, trust, and recognition within one's community. Applied to E-CLIP, structural reintegration involves livelihood and educational support, while relational reintegration focuses on community acceptance, social cohesion, and trust-building.

When these two dimensions are achieved, former rebels are more likely to remain peaceful, reducing the risk of recidivism. Conversely, if reintegration support is insufficient or if stigma persists, the likelihood of relapsing into insurgency increases.

This theory supports the study's premise that effective reintegration mechanisms, both economic and social, can prevent recidivism and strengthen community stability. It helps frame how the E-CLIP program facilitates former rebels' transition from combatants to productive citizens.

Human Needs Theory emphasizes that conflict arises when individuals or groups are deprived of fundamental needs such as security, identity, recognition, participation, and development. These needs are non-negotiable and must be satisfied to achieve lasting peace.




Figure 1. Human Needs Theory

In the context of this study, E-CLIP can be viewed as a peacebuilding mechanism aimed at satisfying the basic human needs of former insurgents, providing them with economic stability, social recognition, and community belonging. If these needs remain unmet, frustration and alienation may drive individuals back into rebellion.

The theory underlines the psychological and emotional dimensions of reintegration. It guides research in assessing whether E-CLIP addresses not only material but also social and psychological needs that influence peace and recidivism.

Social Capital Theory argues that networks, trust, and norms of reciprocity within a community are vital for cooperation and social stability. High levels of social capital promote collective action and peace, while low levels can lead to alienation and renewed conflict.




Figure 2. Social Capital Theory

In reintegration contexts, social capital refers to the relationships between former rebels, local communities, and institutions. E-CLIP's effectiveness depends on how well it fosters social trust, community acceptance, and collaboration between returnees and local stakeholders.

This theory helps explain the role of community engagement in sustaining reintegration. It supports the notion that reintegration is not merely an individual process but a collective social endeavor involving the entire community. Strengthened social capital contributes to reduced recidivism and improved peace and security.

1.3. Conceptual Framework

This section presents the variable to be used in the study.

Figure 3 below presents the study's paradigm. It was based on the three-step analysis called the IPO System (input, process, and output). Within each component are specific criterion variables corresponding to the research questions that the study sought to answer.




Figure 3. Research Paradigm

The main components of the input box include reintegration factors for financial support, livelihood assistance, psychosocial interventions, education/training, community-based support, insurgency recidivism (community acceptance), economic opportunities, livelihood sustainability, and local government support mechanisms. It also includes local peace and security as to reduction of insurgency recidivism, and improvement in local peace and security.

On the second block are the processes such as the data analysis of the level of integration factors, of insurgency recidivism among former rebel beneficiaries of E-CLIP, and of local peace and security, and the correlation analysis on the relationship between reintegration factors and insurgency recidivism among former rebel beneficiaries of E-CLIP, and relationship between reintegration factors and local and peace and security in the communities where E-CLIP is implemented.

As reflected in the last block, the researcher will develop specific policy recommendations based on respondents' feedback to improve and strengthen the implementation of E-CLIP in DILG IV-A CALABARZON. Since the evaluation of the E-CLIP implementation is not a one-time process, as it may still undergo continuous revisions, the same process may be repeated in the future. The feedback loop represented by the arrow from the output is designed to reconfirm the research findings with the input variables.

1.4. Statement of the Problem

This study aims to determine the effect of reintegration on insurgency recidivism and local peace and security for maximum E-CLIP implementation.

Specifically, it sought to determine how reintegration factors influence reductions in recidivism and improvements in peace and security in local communities and answer the following questions:

- What is the level of reintegration factors as to:
 - * financial support and livelihood assistance,
 - * psychosocial interventions,
 - * education/training, and
 - * community-based support?
- What is the level of insurgency recidivism among former rebel beneficiaries of E-CLIP as to:
 - * community acceptance,
 - * effectiveness of monitoring and aftercare support, and
 - * economic opportunities?
- What is the level of local peace and security in terms of:
 - * reduction of insurgency recidivism, and
 - * improvement in local peace and security?
- Is there a significant relationship between reintegration factors and insurgency recidivism among former rebel beneficiaries of E-CLIP?
- Is there a significant relationship between reintegration factors and local peace and security in the communities where E-CLIP is implemented?
- Based on the findings, what policy recommendations can be proposed to enhance the implementation of the E-CLIP toward sustainable reintegration, reduced recidivism, and improved peace and security?

1.5. Research Hypotheses

Based on the questions stated above, the hypotheses were tested:

1. There is a significant relationship between reintegration factors and insurgency recidivism among former rebel beneficiaries of E-CLIP.

2. There is a significant relationship between reintegration factors and local peace and security in the communities where E-CLIP is implemented.

1.6. Significance of the Study

This study is important because it provides empirical evidence on how reintegration factors affect insurgency recidivism and local peace and security within the context of E-CLIP implementation in DILG IV-A CALABARZON. The findings will be useful to various stakeholders, especially government agencies, local authorities, and peace advocates, in developing more effective strategies that target both the social and structural causes of insurgency.

Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) - The study will serve as the basis for enhancing the E-CLIP monitoring systems, policies, and program structure. The department can improve how support mechanisms are delivered and ensure long-term reintegration success by identifying which reintegration factors—such as financial and livelihood assistance, psychosocial services, and education and training—have the greatest impact on reducing insurgency recidivism.

Local Government Units (LGUs), particularly those in CALABARZON - The study benefits the community by recognizing the importance of partnering with rural banks to promote financial inclusion, support small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs), and enhance fiscal management. These partnerships align with the goals of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Financial Inclusion Strategy Framework (2022) and the Philippine Development Plan (2023–2028), which both emphasize integrating financial innovation into local administration. Developing evidence-based policies that boost economic participation, reduce poverty, and expand access to public services can be guided by understanding how financial institutions improve service delivery.

Policymakers - This study provides evidence-based insights that could influence future updates to the E-CLIP operational guidelines or Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2018-01. To prevent insurgent recidivism, the findings may lead to policy suggestions that improve resource allocation, support the sustainability of livelihood programs, and boost community acceptance.

Future Researchers and Academics - This study contributes to the limited literature on post-conflict reintegration and its impact on local security and peace in the Philippine context, especially in transitional urban-rural areas like CALABARZON. It can serve as a resource for future research on social reintegration, governance, and peacebuilding. Finally, the study provides communities and former rebels a voice in assessing the real effects of reintegration efforts, promoting inclusive peace and shared accountability in nation-building.

1.7. Scope and Limitation of the Study

The study focused on the reintegration experiences of former rebels enrolled in the E-CLIP within the selected locality (e.g., province or region). It assessed the perceived effects of reintegration on insurgency recidivism and local peace and security. Respondents included are the E-CLIP beneficiaries.

It was limited to E-CLIP-related interventions and outcomes within the specified geographic area. Other reintegration programs outside E-CLIP were not included. Data accuracy depended on participants' willingness to disclose information, and access to official security data might have been limited by confidentiality concerns. Nonetheless, triangulation of data sources was employed to enhance validity and reliability.

1.8. Review of Related Literature and Studies

This chapter presents a literature review based on various sources, including books, journals,

unpublished materials, and online resources.

1.8.1. Related Literature

Strong research on five essential reintegration elements provides the theoretical basis for improving the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) and lowering recidivism.

The study by Bashur (2025) examines Basic Income (BI) as a novel strategy for peacebuilding, highlighting its potential to enhance social cohesion and resilience. This literature is extremely pertinent to E-CLIP because it offers a theoretical and policy-based defense of the direct, unconditional financial assistance given to former rebels. It argues that such assistance lessens immediate financial hardship and improves stability, both of which are crucial to preventing recidivism (returning to armed conflict) and guaranteeing local peace and security.

In addition, an examination of cash transfers in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) procedures (cited in an electronic resource, 2025) argues that financial aid gives beneficiaries greater autonomy, dignity, and choice in addressing their diverse needs. This study is pertinent to evaluating the manner and adequacy of E-CLIP's financial support, as it suggests that if the cash component is viewed as too restrictive or insufficient, it may not truly empower beneficiaries economically weakening a fundamental barrier against recidivism.

Moving on to livelihood assistance, the International Labor Organization (ILO) highlights in its 2015 guidelines that offering individual jobs is insufficient for stable reintegration, emphasizing the need for a broader range of policies to create an enabling environment for employment, including private-sector commitment and legal frameworks. This viewpoint is crucial to the E-CLIP study because it forces an evaluation of the quality of the local economic context and policy support in addition to the provision of livelihood grants; if the enabling environment is poor, the livelihood assistance may fail, resulting in financial frustration and an increased risk of recidivism, thereby jeopardizing local peace and security.

Additionally, Haddad et al. (2022) address the reintegration of former combatants in militarized societies, emphasizing the need for economic assistance to "unmake" the military identity and "remake" the civilian worker identity by substituting a sustainable job for soldiering. Because it links E-CLIP's livelihood assistance to both economic needs and social identity transformation, this literature is extremely pertinent. The study must determine whether the livelihood support provides enough meaning and respect to foster a new civilian identity, as failing to do so maintains the psychological appeal of the former armed group identity (and the associated violence/recidivism).

In terms of psychosocial interventions, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) emphasizes in its 2015 resource that psychosocial support is essential to DDR processes, pointing out that the challenges of changing social roles and prior combat experience frequently result in enduring negative emotions like depression and PTSD, which are major obstacles to successful reintegration. The quality of E-CLIP's psychosocial interventions is a direct predictor of lowering recidivism and maintaining local peace because untreated trauma and mental health issues among former combatants directly impede their social adjustment and can result in maladaptive behaviors, criminality, or re-involvement in violence.

Regarding education and training, Uddin (2015) highlights that in communities affected by war, an equitable education system is essential to promote inclusivity and avert societal disintegration. This idea is pertinent to the education and training component of E-CLIP because it frames education as a vital tool for social inclusion rather than just a way to provide individual skills (livelihood); the study must determine whether the training provided truly fosters inclusivity in order to prevent the social marginalization that frequently leads people back to armed groups (recidivism).

Research reviewed by Amone-P'Olak (2020) supports this point by showing that the success of skill-training programs for youth affected by war is frequently hampered when mental health and psychosocial support are largely ignored, leading to low uptake and poor employment outcomes. To maximize the likelihood of successful, non-recidivist integration, an effective E-CLIP policy must adopt a truly integrated

approach in which psychosocial readiness precedes or runs concurrently with skills training, as this literature establishes a crucial link between psychosocial factors and education/training.

Lastly, an Oxfam Policy & Practice overview (2015) strongly advocates a Community-Based (CB) approach for more successful peace-building, arguing that reintegration programs frequently fail because they focus only on former rebels, which causes community resentment and strains the process. This literature is extremely pertinent to the E-CLIP study (Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program) because it demonstrates that the community's acceptance of former combatants is crucial to the success of local peace and security; in the absence of strong community-based support, social exclusion and resentment significantly raise the risk of recidivism.

Additionally, the Philippine Development Plan 2023-2028 (2023) emphasizes that maintaining peace and security is the cornerstone of sustainable development, noting that E-CLIP is implemented alongside community development interventions such as PAMANA and the Barangay Development Program. This domestic policy document is essential to the study because it provides the normative framework for policy recommendations to better integrate E-CLIP with these larger community-based initiatives to lower recidivism and strengthen local security. It also validates the government's view of E-CLIP as part of a whole-of-society, community-level peace strategy.

The relapse into armed conflict or related criminal activity, known as insurgency recidivism, is essentially a failure of the social reintegration process. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Handbook on the Prevention of Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of Offenders (2018) highlights the vital significance of successful community-based programs to monitor and support offenders, pointing out that released individuals confront major obstacles like stigmatization and exclusion from their families and communities. By demonstrating that community acceptance is an essential foundation and that its absence directly contributes to the "vicious cycle" of failed integration, reoffending, and threats to local peace and security, this literature establishes the fundamental issue of social rejection, making it extremely relevant to E-CLIP.

Economic empowerment is closely related to the success of reintegration initiatives. According to Obatusin et al. (2019), employment considerably reduces the likelihood of criminal activity, as it helps reestablish relationships with family and children and provides money for necessities. This directly addresses the economic opportunities component of E-CLIP by confirming that meaningful employment, which offers a respectable substitute for the illegal economy of armed groups, is a crucial protective factor against recidivism. Barrios-Fernández and García-Hombrados (2025) found that the establishment of neighborhood institutions and organizations that enhance employability and social integration significantly reduced reincarceration rates.

This relates to the E-CLIP policy recommendations, which state that to strengthen the economic foundation of local peace, the program should give priority to collaborations with regional community-based organizations (CBOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to expand the reach and efficacy of its job facilitation and skills training tracks.

These economic opportunities need to be durable to permanently discourage recidivism. In its analysis of sustainable livelihoods, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2024) highlights the necessity of providing marginalized groups, such as former combatants and their communities, with decent work and livelihood opportunities. It does this by emphasizing the development of social enterprises and bolstering value chain integration. To ensure long-term peace dividends and prevent recidivism, this literature is essential for evaluating the livelihood sustainability of E-CLIP because it forces the study to investigate whether the aid given to former combatants is merely a short-term grant or if it facilitates long-term inclusion into resilient economic value chains.

This is further supported by the World Bank's (2018) policy note on the Philippines Sustainable Livelihood Program, which emphasizes the necessity of establishing reasonable expectations for livelihood programs and bolstering referral connections to other programs in order to guarantee long-term stability and

overcome high vulnerability contexts. This directly relates to E-CLIP since it calls for a critical assessment of the program's current objectives and methods, making sure that its livelihood assistance is coordinated with broader government anti-poverty strategies to improve its sustainability and avoid a return to insurgency because of economic failure.

Additionally, the relationship between program performance and local government is crucial. According to the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2023-2028 (2023), local government entities must support a whole-of-society approach in localized peace engagements and safeguard and develop conflict-vulnerable areas to ensure peace and security. The foundational framework for E-CLIP's local government support mechanisms is provided by this policy document, which affirms that the program's ability to reduce recidivism largely depends on the political will and operational support of Local Government Units (LGUs) within the broader national peace strategy.

The UNDP Guidance Note on Supporting Community-Based Reintegration (2024), which emphasizes the significance of enhancing the efficacy and transparency of community and local government governance to better absorb former members of armed groups, supports this idea. This relates to the study's policy recommendations since it implies that E-CLIP should actively develop LGUs' administrative competence and accountability to successfully manage and integrate the entire peace and reintegration process, in addition to providing benefits.

It is widely acknowledged that community-based integration (CBR) is an essential support tool. According to a 2019 Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) study on local ownership in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), successful reintegration requires persuading communities through incentives such as reparations programs and community service, in which former rebels restore local infrastructure. This is extremely pertinent to E-CLIP because it offers a workable example of how local government assistance can actively promote community acceptance, transforming former rebels from beneficiaries into active contributors.

This reduces social tensions and validates civilian behavior to avert a return to insurgency. Lastly, while evaluating DDR lessons, the Global Security and Development Research Centre (GSDRC) (2016) points out that although programs are frequently short-term, they must be connected to broader national development goals to provide long-lasting impacts. This highlights the necessity of evaluating E-CLIP's effectiveness beyond individual case management and by its capacity to support all-encompassing local development, guaranteeing that the reintegration of the former combatant serves as a catalyst for wider stability, thereby solidifying local peace and removing the structural causes of insurgency recidivism.

Particularly in post-conflict environments, the idea of local peace and security has shifted from being solely a military issue to one that encompasses human security and development. In their work on modern conflict resolution, Ramsbotham et al. (2016) stress that addressing the underlying causes of conflict, such as marginalization and inequality, which persist at the community level, is necessary to achieve lasting peace. This research is essential to the E-CLIP study because it demonstrates that "local peace" refers to conditions that eradicate the structural causes of insurgency rather than just the absence of conflict. The study can develop policy recommendations to prevent former fighters from being dragged back into war (recidivism) by linking E-CLIP's success to addressing these underlying local inequities.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2024), which outlines the significance of integrating peacebuilding efforts with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly in fragile and conflict-affected areas, further emphasizes the direct connection between security and development. Because it presents the decrease in insurgent recidivism as a contribution to the national development objective, this is extremely pertinent to E-CLIP. E-CLIP risks failing if viewed as a siloed security initiative, but by incorporating its results into local development goals, it improves the broader peace and security environment and achieves greater, long-lasting non-recidivism.

Additionally, while programs are frequently short-term, the Global Security and Development

Research Centre (GSDRC) (2016) points out that in order to generate long-lasting impacts, they must be connected to broader national development goals. This highlights the necessity of evaluating E-CLIP's effectiveness beyond individual case management and calls for policy suggestions that guarantee the reintegration of former combatants serves as a catalyst for wider stability, thereby removing the structural causes of insurgency recurrence.

The function of local administration in reducing threats is essential to maintaining local peace and security. According to the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2023-2028 (2023), local government entities must support a whole-of-society approach in localized peace engagements and safeguard and develop conflict-vulnerable areas to ensure peace and security. The study's foundational background is provided by this policy statement, which affirms that the Local Government Units' (LGUs') political will and efficient operational assistance play a major role in reducing recidivism through E-CLIP.

The literature serves as the foundation for policy proposals meant to improve LGUs' ability to oversee and assimilate the reintegration process. In addition, a 2019 study by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) on local ownership in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) highlights that successful reintegration requires persuading communities through incentives like community service projects run by former combatants. This is extremely pertinent because it offers a workable example of how LGUs can actively leverage E-CLIP recipients to upgrade local infrastructure, thereby enhancing the local security environment by fostering community acceptance and validating the beneficial civilian role of the former combatant.

When economic fragility is addressed, insurgency recidivism is much decreased. To sustain long-term stability and address high vulnerability, the World Bank (2018) policy paper on the Philippines Sustainable Livelihood Program emphasizes the need to set reasonable expectations for livelihood programs and to strengthen referral links to other programs. This directly relates to E-CLIP, as the difficulty of maintaining a sustainable livelihood often forces former rebels to return to the funding sources of armed organizations.

Therefore, to genuinely ensure local peace, the policy proposals must support a rigorous evaluation of E-CLIP against the standard of realistic, integrated, and sustainable economic consequences. Additionally, the UNODC Handbook on the Prevention of Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of Offenders (2018) highlights the vital role of effective community-based programs to monitor and support individuals, noting that released individuals encounter major obstacles, such as stigmatization and exclusion from their families and communities. The study's emphasis on community integration techniques is essential because this literature shows that the probability of recidivism is significant in the absence of true community acceptance and support, which can lead to a breakdown in local peace and security.

Justice and transitional security play a crucial role in preserving regional harmony. In his discussion of peace and security as a post-liberal idea, Richmond (2015) argues that, rather than relying exclusively on central state power, sustained peace requires the establishment of legitimate local institutions that are sensitive to people's needs and equipped to confront persistent insecurity. This is very important because it implies that E-CLIP's ability to prevent recidivism depends on how well it establishes or strengthens local, legitimate security and justice systems that can mediate local disputes and keep former rebels from believing that using violence is the only way to resolve their grievances.

Lastly, according to a United Nations Security Council (2015) resource on security system reform (SSR), the goal of SSR is to improve the state's ability to deliver security and justice to its citizens in a manner consistent with democratic values. This idea is pertinent to E-CLIP policy because it suggests that the success of local integration should eventually lead to a revised local security architecture in which the LGU and its security agencies are the reliable sources of peace, decreasing the need for and appeal of non-state armed groups and ensuring a non-recidivist environment. Therefore, E-CLIP's long-term goal is to turn conflict-ridden areas into secure, stable communities. This is the ultimate test of the program's effectiveness

and of local peace and security.

1.8.2. Related Studies

The success of post-conflict reintegration initiatives is strongly dependent on the solidity of the support package, with financial help often serving as the initial stabilizer. According to Lough et al. (2018), who examined conditional and unconditional cash transfers in DDR contexts, unconditional financial support significantly reduced former rebels' immediate economic vulnerabilities, thereby decreasing the likelihood that they would rejoin armed groups or engage in predatory activities. This finding is extremely pertinent to E-CLIP because it shows empirically that the initial financial assistance component is an essential, evidence-based tool for immediate recidivism prevention, highlighting the need to ensure the assistance is adequate and delivered on time to maintain local peace.

Effective livelihood help is essential for long-term civilian life in addition to financial aid. Programs providing market-driven vocational training directly linked to local private-sector demand led to higher rates of formal employment and significantly lower levels of conflict-related grievances and political violence, according to empirical research by Burt et al. (2020) on former fighters in the Middle East. The study must determine whether E-CLIP's training is responsive to real local economic prospects, as this directly influences policy recommendations to bolster E-CLIP's livelihood component. The livelihood projects will increase the likelihood of recidivism and jeopardize local security if they are unable to offer sustained income and break the economic reliance on insurgency.

A study by Haddad et al. (2022) that examined the psychosocial difficulties faced by former rebels seeking work further emphasizes the connection between economic achievement and communal setting. According to their findings, stigma and discrimination from potential employers seriously hampered job placement even with skill training, serving as a significant catalyst for despair and relapse into armed organizations. This is pertinent to E-CLIP because it shows that, to ensure that economic opportunities lead to long-term security benefits and non-recidivism, the program must actively encourage employer involvement and anti-stigma campaigns (community support) in addition to merely providing skills (livelihood).

The importance of psychosocial well-being in reducing recidivism is increasingly recognized. In a mixed-methods study on youth affected by war, Amone-P'Olak (2020) found that untreated trauma, especially Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), was a major obstacle to education, work, and general social functioning, increasing the likelihood of reoffending and engaging in antisocial behaviors. This empirical data is crucial to the E-CLIP study because it forces an assessment of how well-staffed and comprehensive the program's psychosocial interventions are. This is because failing to address underlying trauma directly jeopardizes the effectiveness of all other reintegration factors, raising the risk of recidivism and local instability.

It is crucial to combine skill development with psychosocial treatment. According to a study by Newnham et al. (2015) on young people in post-conflict Africa, those who received concurrent, easily accessible mental health treatment were much more likely to enroll in and successfully complete vocational training. To ensure the practical application of educational gains, the study specifically advised that reintegration programs employ an integrated approach in which psychological preparedness precedes or runs alongside skills training. This result implies a critical policy recommendation for E-CLIP: to optimize their efficacy in

lowering the behavioral and economic causes of recidivism, the program's many components must be structurally connected rather than run in silos.

Additionally, training and education are investments in long-term security. According to Uddin (2015), access to fair and non-discriminatory educational opportunities for former rebels was strongly linked to the development of a successful, stable civilian identity and to increased societal tolerance, thereby lessening the ideological attractiveness of armed groups. This highlights the need to see E-CLIP's education component as a tool for social and political inclusion as well to make money (livelihood). The study should determine whether the educational options offered by E-CLIP indeed promote equity and inclusion, which are

essential building blocks for long-term peace and non-recidivism.

In the end, local government and community-based assistance are critical to the durability of reintegration. Programs that used a strong community-based approach (CBA), which actively involved communities in planning and benefit sharing, were far more successful in achieving social acceptance and long-term peace than those that only targeted former rebels, according to a case study review (Oxfam Policy & Practice, 2015). This finding is particularly pertinent to E-CLIP, whose name highlights Local Integration; in the absence of clear community acceptance and benefit-sharing, the former fighters experience social marginalization, which is a significant risk factor for recidivism.

To operationalize this community support, the local government's participation is crucial. Strong LGU commitment, as demonstrated by the distribution of local resources and policy mandates, was the single best indicator of a program's capacity to guarantee local peace and security, according to a 2019 study on local ownership in DDR by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). This is extremely pertinent to the E-CLIP study because it calls for policy recommendations that would require or encourage local government units (LGUs) to actively appropriate funds and incorporate E-CLIP into their local development plans. This would institutionalize support and create a stable security environment that discourages recidivism.

Furthermore, the issue of local corruption and poor governance must be actively addressed in the social reintegration process. In their second finding, Lough et al. (2018) demonstrated that even well-funded reintegration programs had significant failure rates in areas with high levels of local corruption and weak rule of law, due to a lack of security guarantees and the exploitation of economic gains. This is an important conclusion for E-CLIP policy, indicating that concurrent measures to increase local government accountability and transparency are necessary for both successful recidivism reduction and local peace and security.

Lastly, a crucial endpoint is provided by the connection between security sector reform and reintegration success. The most significant decreases in conflict-related violence occurred when the reintegration of former combatants was combined with a perceived improvement in the legitimacy and responsiveness of local security forces and judicial institutions, according to a study by Betancourt et al. (2023) examining security transitions in Latin America. Because it presents the decrease in recidivism as the result of improved local security, this research is highly pertinent. Therefore, the goal of E-CLIP's policy suggestions must be a synergistic effect in which the successful integration of former combatants both supports and is shielded by a more reliable and effective local security architecture.

Recidivism among ex-insurgents is essentially a result of their inability to successfully reintegrate into society and the economy. In a meta-analysis of post-conflict nations, Rivas et al. (2018) found that social isolation and the inability to let go of prior armed identity were the two biggest predictors of recidivism. The study must evaluate the degree of community acceptability as a crucial barrier to recidivism, which directly affects the stability of local peace and security. This empirical conclusion is particularly relevant to E-CLIP, whose core is local integration.

One of the main "push" factors for returning to armed organizations is economic instability. Burt A. and Al-Khatib R. (2020) study of former combatants in the Middle East empirically showed that programs providing market-driven vocational training directly linked to local private-sector demand led to higher rates of formal employment and significantly lower levels of political violence and conflict-related grievances. This directly verifies the economic possibilities component of the E-CLIP, demonstrating that the livelihood training must be deliberately integrated into the local economy to offer real, appealing alternatives to the insurgency's financial structure for the program to effectively dissuade recidivism.

To avoid recurrence, economic opportunity must also be sustained. While initial financial grants stabilized recipients, Lough et al.'s (2018) analysis of conditional cash transfers in DDR contexts revealed that the lack of long-term livelihood sustainability after the program ended often led to the recurrence of economic vulnerability, leaving participants vulnerable to recruitment. To ensure that former

fighters do not recidivate and continue to contribute to local peace, this outcome is critical to the E-CLIP study and compels policy recommendations to focus not only on grantmaking but also on providing long-term finance and market access for them.

It is impossible to overestimate the host community's contribution to these economic benefits. According to a study by Haddad et al. (2022) that focused on the difficulties faced by former rebels looking for work, stigma and discrimination from potential employers and community members seriously hampered job placement and served as a significant catalyst for desperation and relapse into armed groups. This empirical data is significant because it shows that E-CLIP must actively address the social environment (community acceptability) in addition to providing skills (livelihood) to ensure that economic endeavors lead to long-term improvements in security and preserve local peace.

To institutionalize long-term stability, local government support systems are essential. Pherali (2015) stated on his study on post-conflict governance in Nepal showed that the sustainability of ex-combatant integration was considerably higher in areas where decentralized, local government structures actively embraced responsibility for reintegration and allocated local resources than in programs that relied exclusively on central government or non-governmental organizations. This result is extremely pertinent to the E-CLIP study because it highlights the need for policy recommendations that require or reward Local Government Units (LGUs) to assume the role of primary, institutionalized guarantors of the program's success, which is crucial for long-term local peace and security.

Furthermore, the integrity of the program is affected by the quality of this local governance. Lough et al. (2018) also found that even well-funded reintegration programs had significant failure rates in areas with high levels of local corruption and weak rule of law, because the former combatants' trust was undermined by the extraction of economic benefits and the lack of security assurances. This implies that, to safeguard the reintegration process itself and address the structural frustrations that lead to recidivism, the E-CLIP study should include policy recommendations to enhance local government accountability and openness as a parallel security measure.

Local governments can actively manage community-based assistance to ensure social acceptance. Programs with a strong community-based approach (CBA), which included former rebels in visible community service or peace initiatives, were much more successful in gaining social acceptance, according to a case study assessment (Oxfam Policy & Practice, 2015). To actively change community perception and validate the former combatant's new civilian role, which is crucial to preventing recidivism, LGUs should employ former combatants in local infrastructure or peace-building projects (community service), according to this finding, which offers a useful blueprint for E-CLIP.

Inclusion is intrinsically tied to the idea of local peace and security. Uddin (2015) showed that for former rebels, access to fair and non-discriminatory educational opportunities was strongly associated with developing a successful, stable civilian identity and with raising societal tolerance, thereby lessening the ideological appeal of armed groups. This is pertinent to E-CLIP because it demonstrates that the program's effectiveness in reducing recidivism stems from its capacity to provide real, non-marginalizing paths into civilian society, thereby enhancing the community's overall security and inclusion.

Recidivism is nearly inevitable without local assistance. The UNODC Handbook on the Prevention of Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of Offenders (2018) makes clear that in the absence of successful community-based programs, released individuals confront serious obstacles like stigmatization and exclusion from their families and communities, which serve as major triggers for reoffending. This demonstrates the importance of the E-CLIP study's emphasis on all elements that promote a supportive community environment, since the absence of such support directly jeopardizes local harmony.

Lastly, the long-term viability of the security ecosystem as a whole need to be considered. When the reintegration of former combatants was combined with a perceived improvement in the legitimacy and responsiveness of local security forces and judicial institutions, the strongest reductions in conflict-related violence occurred, according to research by Betancourt et al. (2023) on security transitions. This is extremely

pertinent to E-CLIP because it implies that the program's effectiveness in reducing recidivism must eventually support and be safeguarded by a revised local security architecture in which the LGU and its institutions are viewed as trustworthy and legitimate sources of peace.

The modern concept of local peace and security emphasizes sustainable human security rather than just ceasefires. In their study of modern conflict resolution, Ramsbotham et al. (2016) highlight the need to address the underlying causes of conflict, such as marginalization and inequality, which are mostly found at the community level, to achieve lasting peace. This fundamental conclusion is extremely pertinent to the E-CLIP study because it shows that "local peace" is a prerequisite for non-recidivism; E-CLIP is unlikely to be successful in keeping former fighters from relapsing if it ignores these localized structural causes of conflict.

Integrating security and development initiatives is a vital strategy for preserving local peace. Programs that effectively integrate peacebuilding efforts with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially local economic initiatives, exhibit a strong correlation with sustained stability in fragile and conflict-affected areas, according to an analysis conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2024. This is important for E-CLIP because it shows that the program's effectiveness in reducing recidivism should be evaluated based on its demonstrable contribution to broader, regional human development objectives, thereby maintaining peace.

Additionally, programs connected to broader national and local development initiatives produced more sustained effects and better long-term security outcomes, according to the Worldwide Security and Development Research Center (GSDRC) (2016), which reviewed worldwide DDR lessons. This highlights the necessity of implementing E-CLIP's policy recommendations to guarantee that the program is structurally integrated into local government development plans, thereby eliminating the structural causes of recidivism and making the reintegration of former combatants a beneficial contribution to community stability and security.

Converting security advances into long-term peace depends heavily on local governance. The national empirical background is provided by the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2023-2028 (2023), which states that local government entities must support a whole-of-society approach in localized peace engagements to achieve peace and security. This policy mandate is essential to the E-CLIP study because it confirms that the LGUs' strong operational support and policy commitment are critical to the program's capacity to lower recidivism. According to this research, policy recommendations should emphasize developing LGUs' ability and providing them with incentives to actively oversee the reintegration process.

In addition, Pherali (2015) stated on his study on post-conflict governance showed that ex-combatant integration was much more sustainable in areas where decentralized, local government structures actively accepted responsibility for reintegration. This is extremely pertinent, demonstrating that when local government units (LGUs) transition from passive acceptance to active institutional guarantors of the reintegration process, long-term local peace is maintained.

Addressing the structural risks to stability is another aspect of effective governance. In their study of cash transfers, Lough et al. (2018) discovered that even well-funded reintegration programs had high failure rates in areas with high levels of local corruption and weak rule of law because the former combatants' trust was undermined by the extraction of economic gains and the lack of security guarantees. This is an important conclusion for E-CLIP policy: concurrent efforts to increase local government accountability and transparency are necessary to eradicate the structural grievances that frequently push people back into insurgency, thereby achieving lasting local peace and security, as assessed by non-recidivism.

Community interactions are linked to the human component of local peace. The UNODC Handbook on the Prevention of Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of Offenders (2018) offers factual proof that a significant contributing factor to reoffending is the failure of social reintegration, which is fueled by stigmatization and exclusion from family and community. This demonstrates the importance of the E-CLIP study's emphasis on elements that promote a supportive community environment, as the absence of such support creates a hostile atmosphere in which recidivism becomes an alternative route to survival and

belonging, directly endangering local peace.

In response, Oxfam Policy & Practice (2015) conducted a case study analysis and found that programs that used a strong community-based approach (CBA) and actively involved former rebels in peace projects or visible community service were much more successful in gaining social acceptance. This offers an empirical guide for E-CLIP policy, recommending that local government units (LGUs) support community initiatives that enable former rebels to actively exhibit their positive role, which is essential to changing community attitudes and preserving local security.

Lastly, the ultimate indicator of E-CLIP's effectiveness is the long-term stability of the local security environment. When the reintegration of former combatants was combined with a perceived improvement in the legitimacy and responsiveness of local security forces and judicial institutions, the strongest reductions in conflict-related violence occurred (Betancourt et al., 2023) on security transitions. This is extremely pertinent, as it illustrates the decrease in recidivism due to a more robust and reliable local security environment. Therefore, policy proposals for E-CLIP must strive for a synergistic impact in which the effective integration of former combatants both supports and is shielded by a more legitimate local security architecture.

1.8.3. Synthesis

The review of related literature emphasizes that a thorough, multi-sectoral intervention encompassing economic, psychosocial, social, governance, and security aspects is necessary for the successful reintegration of former fighters. Scholars have continuously emphasized that economic instability, social isolation, unresolved psychological trauma, and insufficient institutional support systems are the main factors that impact recidivism in a variety of post-conflict scenarios. Together, these results offer compelling theoretical and empirical justification for assessing how well the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) fosters local peace and security as well as sustainable reintegration.

Several studies emphasize the importance of livelihood support and financial aid as cornerstones of reintegration. Unconditional financial aid dramatically reduces former combatants' immediate economic vulnerability, which, in turn, lowers their likelihood of rejoining armed groups, according to research by Lough et al. (2018). But the study also showed that if long-term economic viability is not attained, financial assistance alone is not enough.

Burt et al. (2020) provided evidence supporting this claim, showing that market-driven vocational training programs closely aligned with local labor demands greatly enhance job outcomes and reduce grievances related to conflicts. Although economic empowerment is emphasized in both studies as a deterrent to recidivism, Burt et al. place more emphasis on long-term livelihood sustainability through employment integration, while Lough et al. concentrate on short-term stabilization through financial handouts.

Several academics stress the impact of social acceptance and community integration on reintegration success, alongside economic considerations. According to Haddad et al. (2022), even with skill training, stigma and discrimination from employers and community members continue to be significant obstacles to employment for former combatants. Similarly, Rivas et al. (2018) found that the main predictors of recidivism were social isolation and the maintenance of an armed persona. Rivas et al. emphasize broader social identity transformation, whereas Haddad et al. focus on discrimination related to work. The significance of community acceptability as a critical component in maintaining reintegration outcomes is emphasized in both studies.

The usefulness of psychosocial therapies in resolving reintegration issues is also well supported by the literature. According to Amone-P'Olak (2020), untreated trauma, especially Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), severely impairs a person's capacity to engage in social interactions, work, and education, making them more likely to relapse into armed conflict. According to Newnham et al. (2015), participants who received integrated mental health assistance in addition to vocational training demonstrated higher rates of program completion and occupational success, lending credence to this. Amone-P'Olak

concentrates on the detrimental effects of untreated trauma, but Newnham et al. emphasize the value of a comprehensive reintegration framework and the efficacy of combining livelihood programs with psychosocial assistance.

Another important long-term reintegration method is education. According to Uddin (2015), fair access to education fosters social tolerance and the formation of a stable civilian identity, thereby lessening the ideological appeal of armed groups. This result is consistent with the findings of Ramsbotham et al. (2016), who highlighted the importance of tackling systemic injustices and marginalization to achieve lasting peacebuilding. Ramsbotham et al. present education as a component of broader structural conflict-resolution solutions, whereas Uddin focuses on education as a reintegration mechanism.

The literature also provides strong support for community-based reintegration strategies. Programs that included benefit-sharing and community involvement achieved greater social acceptance and better long-term peace outcomes (Oxfam Policy & Practice, 2015). Similarly, continuous stigmatization and a lack of social reintegration raise the chance of reoffending considerably, according to a 2018 UNODC analysis. The UNODC highlights the social consequences of marginalization and exclusion, while Oxfam offers practical solutions, such as enlisting former combatants in community service projects.

It is frequently underlined that institutional support and local government play a crucial role in determining the durability of reintegration. GPPAC (2019) found that strong local government ownership, policy support, and resource allocation were important determinants of successful reintegration programs. Similarly, Pherali (2015) showed that by instituting local support systems, decentralized governance structures greatly enhance the sustainability of reintegration. The Philippine Development Plan (2023–2028), which encourages localized peace engagements using a whole-of-society approach, supports these findings. Pherali emphasizes decentralized governance as a key to long-term reintegration success, whereas GPPAC focuses on policy commitment and resource mobilization.

Program efficacy is also influenced by the quality of governance. According to Lough and Miller (2018), reintegration initiatives are undermined by corruption and a weak rule of law, as these undermine security assurances for former fighters and erode confidence. Similarly, the UNDP (2024) and GSDRC (2016) emphasized the importance of integrating reintegration programs into broader development frameworks to ensure long-term stability. The GSDRC and UNDP emphasize structural integration with national and local development goals, whereas Lough et al. highlight governance risks at the implementation level.

Lastly, the literature acknowledges the significance of institutional trust and legitimacy in the security sector in maintaining reintegration outcomes. Successful reintegration is strongly linked to increased legitimacy and responsiveness of local security and justice systems, which considerably lowers conflict-related violence, according to Betancourt et al. (2023). This bolsters the claim made by Ramsbotham et al. (2016) that resolving the structural causes of insecurity is necessary for lasting peace. Ramsbotham et al. offer the theoretical underpinnings linking institutional trust to sustained peacebuilding, whereas Betancourt et al. focus on the practical effects of security sector reforms.

All things considered, the literature analysis shows that successful reintegration programs need to take an integrated approach that concurrently addresses institutional security, community acceptance, educational inclusion, psychosocial healing, economic empowerment, and support for local governance. The studies all reach the same conclusion: successful reintegration directly reduces recidivism and promotes long-term local peace and security. Their areas of attention, however, vary: some prioritize immediate economic stabilization, others social and psychological healing, and yet others institutional frameworks and governance. The deployment of E-CLIP as a complete reintegration mechanism aimed at fostering long-term peace and averting relapses into armed conflict is strongly justified by these combined findings.

2. Methodology

This chapter presents the research methodology used throughout the study. It covers the research

procedure, research instrument, population and sampling techniques, research design, and statistical analysis of the data.

2.1. Research Design

A research design allows the researcher to arrive at an appropriate plan to specify the methods and procedures for deciding the type of data to be collected, and the methods to be used in data analysis. The design also clearly specifies the relationships among the variables being studied.

To ascertain the impact of reintegration factors on insurgency recidivism and local peace and security under the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) in DILG IV-A CALABARZON, this study used a descriptive-correlational research design. The descriptive component of the design seeks to ascertain the degree of reintegration factors, insurgency recidivism, and local peace and security as perceived by the respondents. In the meantime, the correlational component examined the connection between the dependent variables (local peace and security and insurgent recidivism) and the reintegration elements (independent variables).

This design was appropriate because it allowed the researcher to describe existing conditions and relationships among variables without manipulating them (Creswell, 2014). By using quantitative methods and statistical tools, the study objectively measured the influence of reintegration components, such as financial and livelihood assistance, psychosocial services, education and training, and community support, on the outcomes of insurgency recidivism and community peace. This design aligns with the study's goal of generating data-driven insights to inform policy recommendations for improved E-CLIP implementation.

2.2. Respondents of the Study

The respondents of the study included former E-CLIP rebel beneficiaries who have been reintegrated into DILG IV-A CALABARZON's jurisdiction, as well as specific local government employees directly involved in the program's execution, such as representatives of the Peace and Order Council (POC) and members of the Provincial and City/Municipal Task Forces to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (TF-ELCAC).

Specifically, the respondents include:

- Former rebels who received E-CLIP benefits from 2020–2024 and are currently residing in CALABARZON provinces (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon); and
- DILG or LGU officers designated as E-CLIP focal persons; and

The combination of respondents ensures a comprehensive perspective, including both the implementation insights of government officials and the lived experiences of recipients. The total number of respondents was based on the number of E-CLIP recipients in each province, as verified by DILG IV-A's statistics.

Table 1 presents the distribution of the study's population and the corresponding sample size derived using Slovin's Formula with a 10% margin of error. The respondents were grouped into two main clusters: former rebels and DILG or LGU officers designated as E-CLIP focal persons across the five provinces of CALABARZON: Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon.

Table 1. Population and Sample of the Study

Cluster	Name of Province	Population	Frequency
Former Rebels	Cavite	5	1
	Laguna	120	15
	Batangas	104	13

DILG or LGU officers designated as E-CLIP focal persons	Rizal	50	7
	Quezon	387	51
	TOTAL	666	87
	Cavite	1	1
	Laguna	1	1
	Batangas	1	1
	Rizal	1	1
	Quezon	1	1
	TOTAL	5	5
	GRAND TOTAL	671	93

Slovin's Formula with 10% margin of error

For former rebels, the total population across the region is 666, with Quezon having the highest number at 387, followed by Laguna (120), Batangas (104), Rizal (50), and Cavite (5). Using Slovin's Formula, the total sample size for this group is 87. This reflects proportional allocation based on the population in each province, resulting in the largest sample from Quezon (51), followed by Laguna (15), Batangas (13), Rizal (7), and Cavite (1).

The second cluster includes DILG or LGU E-CLIP focal persons, totaling 5, representing one designated officer per province. Given the manageable population size, the entire group was included through total enumeration, yielding a sample size of 5.

Overall, the study has a grand total population of 671 individuals and a corresponding sample size of 93 respondents. This sampling distribution ensures adequate representation of both former rebels and E-CLIP focal persons while maintaining proportionality across provinces.

2.3. Sampling Technique

Purposive sampling, which is suitable for choosing participants with particular roles, experiences, or expertise pertinent to the research problem, was used in this study (Palinkas et al., 2015). This only contained people who have directly benefited from or participated in E-CLIP.

The researcher used quota-based stratification in each province in CALABARZON to ensure proportional participation. For instance, compared to smaller provinces like Rizal, Quezon received a bigger sample size, as DILG IV-A figures indicate that it has the greatest number of beneficiaries. To ensure the authenticity and reliability of the results, the sample size was calculated using Slovin's formula with a 0.05 margin of error.

This sampling approach was appropriate because it ensured equitable representation of former E-CLIP rebel beneficiaries, thereby enhancing the generalizability of the findings.

2.4. Research Instrument

The primary research instrument used in this study was a structured survey questionnaire developed by the researcher to collect quantitative data on the variables identified in the conceptual framework. The questionnaire was designed to measure the independent variable as to reintegration factors (financial and livelihood assistance, psychosocial services, education/training, and community support) and the dependent variables are insurgency recidivism (community acceptance, effectiveness of monitoring and aftercare

support, economic opportunities, livelihood sustainability, and local government support mechanisms) and local peace and security (reduction of insurgency recidivism and improvement in local peace and security). Each indicator was assessed using a four-point Likert scale, with responses ranging from “1 as Strongly Disagree” to “4 as Strongly Agree,” allowing respondents to express the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statements presented.

The instrument underwent content validation by a panel of experts composed of DILG regional officers, peace and order advocates, and academic researchers experienced in public administration and peace studies. Their feedback was used to refine the clarity, relevance, and comprehensiveness of the questionnaire items. A pilot test was conducted with a small group of former rebel beneficiaries not included in the main sample to assess the instrument's reliability. The pilot test data were analyzed using Cronbach's Alpha, and the resulting coefficients indicated that the instrument had acceptable internal consistency across all components.

The final version of the questionnaire was divided into several sections corresponding to the study's variables, ensuring logical flow and ease of understanding for respondents. The first part collects demographic information, including age, gender, location, and duration of E-CLIP participation. The subsequent sections contain items addressing the reintegration factors, indicators of insurgency recidivism, and measures of local peace and security. This structured and validated questionnaire served as the primary tool for gathering reliable, relevant data to achieve the study's objectives and generate evidence-based recommendations to improve E-CLIP implementation in DILG Region IV-A CALABARZON.

2.5. Research Procedures

The study followed a systematic, structured approach to ensure the accuracy, reliability, and validity of the data collected. The process began with securing the necessary permissions and endorsements from the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Region IV-A CALABARZON and its Provincial Offices, as well as from relevant local government units implementing the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP).

After obtaining the required clearances, the researcher coordinated with E-CLIP focal persons and program implementers to identify and locate former rebel beneficiaries who had undergone reintegration within the region. These identified participants were briefed on the objectives and ethical considerations of the study, ensuring voluntary participation and confidentiality of responses.

Subsequently, the researcher administered a structured survey questionnaire designed to measure the variables of the study, specifically, the reintegration factors, insurgency recidivism, and local peace and security. The questionnaire was validated by experts from the DILG, academe, and peace and security sectors before its distribution. The data-gathering process was conducted both in person and online, depending on accessibility and respondents' availability. Assistance from local E-CLIP coordinators and Municipal Task Forces to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (TF-ELCAC) was sought to ensure maximum participation and data completeness.

After the collection phase, all responses were carefully organized, encoded, and subjected to data cleaning and validation to check for consistency and completeness. The researcher then performed statistical analyses aligned with the study's objectives, using descriptive and inferential statistical methods to interpret the results. The findings were analyzed to establish the relationships among reintegration factors, insurgency recidivism, and local peace and security. Finally, based on the results and their implications, policy recommendations were formulated to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of the E-CLIP implementation in DILG Region IV-A CALABARZON.

2.6. Statistical Treatment of Data

The data were organized and processed according to the problems presented in the study. The researcher used quantitative methods to interpret the gathered data. The following are the statistical tools applied in the study.

Research Problem	Statistical Tool used
Quantitative Questions	
1. What is the level of reintegration factors as to: 1.1 financial and livelihood support; 1.2 psychosocial interventions; 1.3 ducation/training; and 1.4 ommunity support?	Weighted Mean and Standard Deviation
2. What is the level of insurgency recidivism among former rebel beneficiaries of E-CLIP as to: 2.1 community acceptance; 2.2 effectiveness of monitoring and aftercare support; and 2.3 economic opportunities?	Weighted Mean and Standard Deviation
3. What is the level of local peace and security in terms of: 3.1 reduction of insurgency recidivism; and 3.2 improvement in local peace and security?	Weighted Mean and Standard Deviation
4. Is there a significant relationship between reintegration factors and insurgency recidivism among former rebel beneficiaries of E-CLIP?	Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient (r)
5. Is there a significant relationship between reintegration factors and local peace and security in the communities where E-CLIP is implemented?	Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient (r)

For the Scoring and Interpretation Guide:

Rating Scale

3.26-4.00

2.51-3.25

1.76-2.50

1.00-1.75

Interpretation

Very High/Strongly Agree

High/Agree

Low/Disagree

Very Low/Strongly Disagree

To give interpretation to the computed Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient (r), the following guide is adopted:

Rating Scale

± 0.91-1.00

± 0.71-0.90

± 0.41-0.70

± 0.21-0.40

± 0.01-0.20

Interpretation

Very High Positive/Negative Correlation

High Positive/Negative Correlation

Moderate Positive/Negative Correlation

Low Positive/Negative Correlation

Very Low Positive/Negative Correlation

To determine whether the correlation is statistically significant, the computed r value was compared with the critical r value from the Pearson correlation table at a 0.05 level of significance (two-tailed test).

- If computed $r > \text{critical } r$, reject the null hypothesis (there is a significant relationship).
- If computed $r \leq \text{critical } r$, fail to reject the null hypothesis (no significant relationship).

3. Results and Discussion

This chapter presents, analyzes, and interprets the data collected to identify the significant

relationship between reintegration factors and local peace and security in the communities where E-CLIP is implemented.

3.1. Level of Reintegration Factors

The level of reintegration factors indicates how effectively former rebels can transition to civilian life with support from the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP). This section examines respondents' perspectives on financial and livelihood aid as important factors influencing successful reintegration and long-term stability. Gaining knowledge of these elements helps one better understand how financial assistance lowers recidivism and improves community inclusion.

The following tables show the level of reintegration factors experienced by the former rebels, which include variables such as financial and livelihood assistance, psychosocial interventions, education and training, and community-based support.

Table 2 indicates that respondents strongly agree with all indicators related to financial and livelihood assistance under the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP), as reflected in the overall weighted mean of 3.56 ($SD = 0.36$). This suggests a consistently high level of perceived effectiveness of the program in facilitating the transition of former rebels into civilian life through economic support mechanisms.

Table 2. Level of Reintegration Factors as to Financial and Livelihood Assistance

Indicators	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Interpretation
1. I received adequate financial assistance from E-CLIP to support transition to civilian life.	3.47	0.59	Strongly Agree
2. The livelihood assistance I received was sufficient to start a sustainable source of income.	3.49	0.50	Strongly Agree
3. The financial assistance provided by E-CLIP was released in a timely and organized manner.	3.63	0.49	Strongly Agree
4. The livelihood project I engaged in continues to provide for my family's needs.	3.43	0.58	Strongly Agree
5. The financial assistance motivated me to stay away from insurgent activities.	3.67	0.47	Strongly Agree
6. The livelihood assistance motivated me to stay away from insurgent activities.	3.68	0.47	Strongly Agree
Overall Weighted Mean	3.56	0.36	Strongly Agree

Legend: $n=87$. This means is interpreted as follows: 3.26-4.00 (Strongly Agree); 2.51-3.25 (Agree); 1.76-2.50 (Disagree); 1.00-1.75 (Strongly Disagree).

The comments that livelihood support ($M = 3.68$, $SD = 0.47$) and financial help ($M = 3.67$, $SD = 0.47$) encouraged respondents to refrain from engaging in insurgent activities had the highest mean scores among the indicators. This result underscores the importance of financial incentives for encouraging disengagement from armed groups and for maintaining reintegration. It backs the United Nations Development Programme's (2018) study, which highlighted the importance of livelihood and financial stability in reducing recidivism among former rebels. Similarly, the World Bank (2020) found that

reintegration initiatives that place a high priority on economic participation significantly reduce the likelihood of returning to violence.

Strong agreement was also found for the indicator of the timely and organized provision of financial support ($M = 3.63$, $SD = 0.49$), suggesting program implementation efficiency. This is consistent with research (Ball et al., 2016), which emphasized that timely and transparent benefit delivery boosts reintegration outcomes and increases trust in government programs. On the other hand, delays or irregularities could damage the program's reputation and deter people from participating.

Additionally, respondents concurred that their livelihood projects continue to meet family needs ($M = 3.43$, $SD = 0.58$) and that the livelihood aid was adequate to establish a sustainable income stream ($M = 3.49$, $SD = 0.50$). These findings imply that E-CLIP interventions support both long-term economic stability and immediate relief. This aligns with research by Banerjee et al. (2017), which found that livelihood interventions can yield long-term gains in income and well-being for vulnerable populations when implemented effectively. Furthermore, Blattman et al. (2015, as noted in subsequent 2019–2021 reintegration studies) emphasized that self-employment and income persistence are increased when skills training is linked with financial aid.

The comparatively high assessment for financial aid adequacy ($M = 3.47$, $SD = 0.59$) further suggests that recipients believe the help is adequate for their transition needs. This supports the conclusions of the International Organization for Migration (2019), which stated that sufficient cash packages are necessary to address persons' immediate economic challenges during reintegration and enable more seamless community reintegration.

Overall, the results show that E-CLIP beneficiaries place a high value on financial and livelihood aid, which is crucial for fostering economic stability, reducing recidivism, and supporting long-term reintegration. These findings are consistent with prior research, which highlights the importance of sustained funding, effective program implementation, and ongoing oversight to ensure that aid remains responsive to the changing needs of former rebels.

Table 3 reveals that respondents strongly agree with all indicators related to psychosocial services, with an overall weighted mean of 3.61 ($SD = 0.34$). This indicates that psychosocial interventions under the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) are perceived as highly effective in supporting the emotional, mental, and social reintegration of former rebels into civilian life.

The statement that psychological therapies increased the ability to avoid returning to insurgent activities had the highest mean score among the indicators ($M = 3.77$, $SD = 0.42$). This underscores the importance of emotional fortitude and mental health in reducing recidivism. This result is in line with the United Nations Development Programme's (2018) report, which highlighted the importance of psychosocial assistance for long-term reintegration by addressing trauma and encouraging behavioral change. Similarly, the World Health Organization (2019) noted that mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) programs considerably lower conflict-affected people's susceptibility to relapse into violence.

Strong agreement was also found for the indicator that psychological assistance assisted in reestablishing links with family and community ($M = 3.69$, $SD = 0.51$), indicating that social reconnection is an essential result of these interventions. Reintegration is both relational and economic, necessitating the rebuilding of social ties and trust. This confirms the International Organization for Migration's (2019) conclusion that long-term reintegration success depends on acceptance from family and society. Additionally, Betancourt et al. (2020) discovered that among former rebels, psychological therapies greatly enhance social functioning and community acceptability.

Table 3. Level of Reintegration Factors as to Psychosocial Services

Indicators		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Interpretation
1.	Counseling services under E-CLIP helped	3.56	0.50	Strongly Agree

me cope with emotional and social challenges.			
2. I was provided with opportunities to participate in psychosocial support rehabilitation activities.	3.40	0.66	Strongly Agree
3. Psychosocial support helped me rebuild relationships with my family and community.	3.69	0.51	Strongly Agree
4. I feel mentally and emotionally prepared to reintegrate into civilian life.	3.62	0.49	Strongly Agree
5. The psychosocial interventions strengthened my ability to avoid returning to insurgent activities.	3.77	0.42	Strongly Agree
Overall Weighted Mean	3.61	0.34	Strongly Agree

Legend: $n=87$. This means is interpreted as follows: 3.26-4.00 (Strongly Agree); 2.51-3.25 (Agree); 1.76-2.50 (Disagree); 1.00-1.75 (Strongly Disagree).

Additionally, respondents strongly agreed that counseling services helped them deal with emotional and social issues ($M = 3.56$, $SD = 0.50$) and that they feel emotionally and cognitively prepared to reintegrate into civilian life ($M = 3.62$, $SD = 0.49$). These results show that trauma, stress, and adjustment issues can be successfully addressed by counseling and therapeutic therapies. This is consistent with Jordan et al. 's (2016) study, which showed that structured psychosocial support programs enhance coping strategies and emotional control among those affected by armed conflict. Furthermore, a study by Bangpan et al. (2017) discovered that psychosocial support enhances adaptive coping mechanisms and self-confidence, both of which are essential for successful reintegration.

Although it was rated as strongly agreeing, the indicator of engagement in psychosocial rehabilitation activities ($M = 3.40$, $SD = 0.66$) had the lowest mean of all the items. This could imply that, despite the availability of opportunities, beneficiaries' access or level of engagement may differ. However, this result is still in line with the broader body of research that recognizes that program accessibility and individual motivation may affect participation levels in psychosocial programs (de Jong et al., 2017).

Overall, the results confirm that E-CLIP's psychological services are essential for improving emotional stability, mending social bonds, and averting insurgency recurrence. Such interventions are essential to comprehensive reintegration efforts, as evidenced by the significant agreement across all parameters. The findings, which align with current research, emphasize the importance of ongoing, easily accessible psychosocial support as a fundamental component of peacebuilding and community reintegration programs.

Table 4 indicates that respondents strongly agree with all indicators related to education and training, as reflected in the overall weighted mean of 3.73 ($SD = 0.27$). This suggests that the education and training components of the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) are highly effective in equipping former rebels with the necessary competencies for successful reintegration into civilian life.

Table 4. Level of Reintegration Factors as to Education and Training

Indicators	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Interpretation
1. I received training that helped me develop	3.69	0.49	Strongly Agree

new livelihood or employment skills.			
2. The education and training activities were relevant to my personal and community needs.	3.78	0.42	Strongly Agree
3. The training improved my confidence in finding lawful employment.	3.75	0.53	Strongly Agree
4. E-CLIP provided adequate educational support to help my reintegration process.	3.66	0.59	Strongly Agree
5. The education and training programs empowered me to contribute positively to my community.	3.77	0.42	Strongly Agree
Overall Weighted Mean	3.73	0.27	Strongly Agree

Legend: $n=87$. This means is interpreted as follows: 3.26-4.00 (Strongly Agree); 2.51-3.25 (Agree); 1.76-2.50 (Disagree); 1.00-1.75 (Strongly Disagree).

The statement that educational and training activities were pertinent to individual and community needs had the highest mean score among the indicators ($M = 3.78$, $SD = 0.42$). This underscores the importance of needs-based, context-specific training programs for achieving significant reintegration outcomes. The United Nations Development Programme (2018), which highlighted that skill development programs adapted to local economic demands greatly increase reintegration success, supports this conclusion. Similarly, demand-driven training programs increase vulnerable populations' employability and income-generating options, according to a 2019 World Bank report.

The indicators suggest that education and training programs increased respondents' confidence in obtaining legal work ($M = 3.75$, $SD = 0.53$) and enabled them to positively contribute to their community ($M = 3.77$, $SD = 0.42$) are closely related. These findings imply that training programs promote civic involvement and self-efficacy in addition to technical competence. This is consistent with the findings of Blattman et al. (2016), who found that employment outcomes and social participation are improved when skills training is coupled with reintegration support. Additionally, education and vocational training programs significantly enhance former rebels' sense of purpose and community involvement (McMullin, 2017).

Strong agreement was also found for the measure of getting training that produced new livelihood or employment abilities ($M = 3.69$, $SD = 0.49$), suggesting that respondents are aware of the program's usefulness. This corroborates the International Labour Organization's (2020) findings, which highlighted the importance of skill development as a route to long-term employment and reintegration, especially in post-conflict environments. To close the gap between former fighters and the formal labor market, skills-based initiatives are crucial.

Despite being marginally lower than the other metrics, the claim that E-CLIP offered sufficient educational assistance for reintegration ($M = 3.66$, $SD = 0.59$) nonetheless shows good agreement. This implies that although educational support is usually adequate, there may be room for improvement in scope or accessibility. This observation aligns with the findings of Özerdem et al.'s (2016) study, which emphasized the need for follow-through procedures and ongoing educational support to maintain reintegration gains among former combatants.

Overall, the results show that E-CLIP's training and education programs are very successful at boosting employability, self-esteem, and constructive community involvement. The high degree of agreement across all measures underscores the importance of human capital development to reintegration initiatives. These findings confirm that pertinent, skill-based, and empowering educational programs are crucial for long-term reintegration success and sustained peacebuilding, which is in line with current research.

Table 5 shows that respondents strongly agree with all indicators of community support, as reflected

in the overall weighted mean of 3.86 (SD = 0.19). This indicates that community acceptance and involvement play a highly significant role in the successful reintegration of former rebels under the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP).

Table 5. Level of Reintegration Factors as to Community Support

Indicators	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Interpretation
1. My community welcomed me positively after my reintegration.	3.93	0.25	Strongly Agree
2. Local leaders and organizations provided support to help me adjust to civilian life.	3.78	0.42	Strongly Agree
3. I feel accepted and respected as a member of the community.	3.95	0.21	Strongly Agree
4. The local community actively participates in E-CLIP reintegration activities.	3.76	0.53	Strongly Agree
5. The sense of community support prevents me from returning to armed struggle.	3.87	0.37	Strongly Agree
Overall Weighted Mean	3.86	0.19	Strongly Agree

Legend: $n=87$. This means is interpreted as follows: 3.26-4.00 (Strongly Agree); 2.51-3.25 (Agree); 1.76-2.50 (Disagree); 1.00-1.75 (Strongly Disagree).

Feeling respected and welcomed as a member of the community had the highest mean score among the indicators ($M = 3.95$, $SD = 0.21$), closely followed by a pleasant welcome to the community upon reintegration ($M = 3.93$, $SD = 0.25$). These results emphasize the crucial role of social acceptability in helping former rebels regain their identity and dignity. This aligns with the International Organization for Migration (2019), which highlighted that promoting a sense of belonging and reducing stigma make community acceptance essential to long-term reintegration. Similarly, Kaplan et al. (2018) found that former rebels with greater social acceptance are more likely to work in productive civilian occupations and less likely to resort to violence.

Strong social networks provide a protective function, as seen by the indicator that community support keeps people from returning to armed conflict ($M = 3.87$, $SD = 0.37$). This implies that reintegration is intricately linked to group dynamics rather than being purely an individual activity. This conclusion is corroborated by the World Bank (2019), which notes that inclusive community settings dramatically lower the likelihood of recidivism by offering social and economic opportunities. Furthermore, a study by Nussio (2016) showed that community involvement and social links are important indicators of long-term disengagement from armed groups.

Additionally, respondents strongly agreed that the community actively participates in E-CLIP reintegration programs ($M = 3.76$, $SD = 0.53$) and that local leaders and organizations helped them adjust to civilian life ($M = 3.78$, $SD = 0.42$). These results show that civil society and local governance structures actively participate in reintegration initiatives. This is consistent with the United Nations Development Programme (2018), which emphasized that the effectiveness and durability of reintegration programs are improved by multi-stakeholder participation, including local leaders and community organizations. Furthermore, community-driven reintegration programs promote trust, collaboration, and shared accountability in post-conflict environments (Söderström, 2016).

Overall, the results show that community support is quite noticeable under E-CLIP and is essential to effective reintegration. Acceptance, respect, and community involvement play a major role in reducing recidivism and fostering long-term peace and stability, as evidenced by strong agreement across all measures. These findings, which align with recent research, confirm that to sustain successful outcomes for former rebels, reintegration programs must continue to bolster community-based strategies and collaborations.

Table 6. Overall Level of Reintegration Factors

Indicators	Mean	Rank	Interpretation
1. Financial and Livelihood Assistance	3.56	4	Very High
2. Psychosocial Services	3.61	3	Very High
3. Education and Training	3.73	2	Very High
4. Community Support	3.86	1	Very High
Overall Weighted Mean	3.69		Very High

Legend: 3.26-4.00 Very High; 2.51-3.25 High; 1.76-2.50 Low; 1.00-1.75 Very Low

Table 6 presents the overall level of reintegration factors, showing that respondents strongly agree across all dimensions, with an overall weighted mean of 3.69. This indicates that the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) is highly effective in facilitating the holistic reintegration of former rebels, addressing not only economic needs but also psychosocial, educational, and community dimensions.

Community support ($M = 3.86$) had the highest mean across the four dimensions, underscoring the critical importance of social acceptability and community involvement in maintaining reintegration. This result is consistent with the International Organization for Migration's (2019) emphasis on the importance of community-based reintegration for long-term stability and the reduction of stigma associated with former combatants. Similarly, Kaplan et al. (2018) found that strong community ties greatly reduce the likelihood of recidivism and encourage constructive citizen engagement.

Education and training come next ($M = 3.73$), highlighting the significance of skill development in boosting employability and independence. This outcome is supported by the International Labour Organization (2020), which points out that skill development in conflict-affected environments enhances access to respectable employment and promotes long-term reintegration. Furthermore, Blattman et al. (2016) noted that vocational training programs boost earning potential and reduce financial vulnerability for former rebels.

Strong agreement was also found for financial and livelihood support ($M = 3.56$) and psychological services ($M = 3.61$), suggesting that both financial and emotional support are essential pillars of reintegration. According to the World Health Organization (2019), psychosocial assistance and mental health help people deal with trauma and lower their chance of relapsing into conflict. Simultaneously, the World Bank (2020) stated that livelihood initiatives and financial support are crucial for meeting short-term economic demands and fostering long-term stability.

The results imply that reintegration under E-CLIP is multifaceted and successful across many important areas, with community support and capacity-building interventions showing particularly strong results. Strong agreement is consistently found across all measures, indicating that successful and long-lasting reintegration requires an all-encompassing strategy that integrates social, psychological, educational, and economic elements. These findings align with current research that emphasizes the importance of comprehensive, community-driven reintegration strategies to establish long-lasting harmony and reduce recidivism.

3.2. Level of Insurgency Recidivism

The degree to which former rebels resume armed activity following reintegration efforts is reflected in the level of insurgency recidivism. To shed light on how well E-CLIP prevents a return to insurgency, this section looks at respondents' relapse-related behaviors and tendencies. To evaluate the durability of peacebuilding initiatives and pinpoint areas for program improvement, it is crucial to comprehend these trends.

Table 7. Level of Insurgency Recidivism as to Community Acceptance

Indicators	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Interpretation
1. I feel fully accepted by the community.	3.94	0.23	Strongly Agree
2. I experience no discrimination because of my past.	3.89	0.32	Strongly Agree
3. My neighbors treat me equally.	3.85	0.36	Strongly Agree
4. I am involved in local decision-making or development programs.	3.71	0.59	Strongly Agree
5. I am satisfied with the level of community acceptance I received.	3.92	0.27	Strongly Agree
Overall Weighted Mean	3.86	0.19	Strongly Agree

Legend: $n=87$. This means is interpreted as follows: 3.26-4.00 (Strongly Agree); 2.51-3.25 (Agree); 1.76-2.50 (Disagree); 1.00-1.75 (Strongly Disagree).

Table 7 indicates that respondents strongly agree with all indicators related to community acceptance, with an overall weighted mean of 3.86 ($SD = 0.19$). This suggests that former rebels experience a high level of acceptance within their communities, which plays a crucial role in reducing the likelihood of insurgency recidivism and supporting sustainable reintegration.

Feeling completely welcomed by the community had the highest mean score among the measures ($M = 3.94$, $SD = 0.23$), closely followed by satisfaction with the degree of community acceptance ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 0.27$). These results emphasize how crucial social inclusion is to helping former rebels feel stable and like they belong. This is in line with the International Organization for Migration (2019), which highlighted that social cohesion and a reduction in stigma make community acceptance essential to successful reintegration. Similarly, Kaplan et al. (2018) discovered that former rebels who feel more accepted are far less likely to engage in combat again.

Strong agreement was also found for the variables of being treated similarly by neighbors ($M = 3.85$, $SD = 0.36$) and experiencing no prejudice because of prior engagement ($M = 3.89$, $SD = 0.32$), suggesting that respondents are typically free from social stigma and exclusion. This corroborates Nussio's (2016) findings, which observed that the absence of prejudice fosters trust and motivates former rebels to take on legitimate and useful roles in society. Additionally, inclusive societies promote equal opportunities and reduce marginalization, thereby lowering recidivism rates, according to a 2019 World Bank analysis.

Although marginally lower than the others, the indicator of participation in local development or decision-making initiatives ($M = 3.71$, $SD = 0.59$) still shows significant agreement. This implies that although there is clear involvement in community projects and governance, respondents' levels of engagement may differ. This result is consistent with the United Nations Development Program's (2018) observation that reintegrated people's ownership and accountability are strengthened when they actively participate in community development. Furthermore, a study by Söderström (2016) highlighted that civic and political engagement is a crucial aspect of reintegration, as it strengthens inclusion and reduces the allure of resuming insurgent activities.

Overall, the results show that community acceptance is highly protective against insurgency recidivism and is particularly evident among responders. The consistently high ratings across every category highlight how crucial inclusive, nondiscriminatory, and participatory community contexts are to maintaining reintegration outcomes. These findings align with recent research that underscores the importance of social acceptance and community involvement in averting conflict recurrence and fostering sustained peace and stability.

Table 8 shows that respondents strongly agree with all indicators related to the effectiveness of monitoring and aftercare support, with an overall weighted mean of 3.79 ($SD = 0.31$). This indicates that

sustained government engagement through monitoring and aftercare mechanisms plays a significant role in preventing insurgency recidivism and ensuring the long-term success of reintegration under the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP).

Monitoring efforts to ensure that respondents remain productive citizens had the highest mean score among the variables ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 0.37$), followed by ease of access to government aid when needed ($M = 3.82$, $SD = 0.47$). These results emphasize the need for ongoing institutional support and accessible services to promote favorable behavioral outcomes. This aligns with the World Bank's (2020) emphasis on the importance of post-reintegration monitoring and support systems for maintaining progress and reducing the likelihood of conflict recurrence. By ensuring new issues are addressed quickly, ongoing involvement helps former fighters become more resilient.

Table 8. Level of Insurgency Recidivism as to the Effectiveness of Monitoring and Aftercare Support

Indicators	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Interpretation
1. Government agencies regularly check my reintegration progress.	3.78	0.56	Strongly Agree
2. I receive continuous support after initial reintegration.	3.79	0.46	Strongly Agree
3. I can easily access government assistance when needed.	3.82	0.47	Strongly Agree
4. The aftercare program addresses my personal and livelihood needs.	3.73	0.49	Strongly Agree
5. Monitoring efforts help ensure I remain a productive citizen.	3.84	0.37	Strongly Agree
Overall Weighted Mean	3.79	0.31	Strongly Agree

Legend: $n=87$. This means is interpreted as follows: 3.26-4.00 (Strongly Agree); 2.51-3.25 (Agree); 1.76-2.50 (Disagree); 1.00-1.75 (Strongly Disagree).

Strong agreement was also found for the indicators of receiving ongoing assistance following initial reintegration ($M = 3.79$, $SD = 0.46$) and routine government agency monitoring of reintegration progress ($M = 3.78$, $SD = 0.56$), indicating that respondents believe there are reliable follow-up mechanisms. This is consistent with the International Organization for Migration's (2019) emphasis that reintegration is a long-term process that calls for ongoing support after initial interventions. Similarly, Humphreys and Weinstein's (2016) study discovered that ongoing program participation considerably enhances reintegration results and lowers the risk of recidivism among ex-fighters.

Although marginally lower than the others, the indicator of aftercare programs serving personal and livelihood needs ($M = 3.73$, $SD = 0.49$) nonetheless shows substantial agreement. This implies that although aftercare programs are typically successful, there may be room to improve by tailoring assistance to meet the needs of everyone. The United Nations Development Programme (2018), which emphasized the importance of individualized and need-based aftercare interventions in guaranteeing long-term reintegration success, supports this conclusion. Furthermore, de Vries et al. (2017) stressed that for reintegration programs to continue to be effective, they must continue to adapt to the changing socioeconomic circumstances of their beneficiaries.

Overall, the results show that E-CLIP's monitoring and aftercare services are highly effective and serve as important safeguards against insurgency recidivism. The high degree of agreement across all metrics underscores the importance of maintaining a government presence, providing readily available services, and having responsive support networks to foster stability and productivity among former rebels. The findings

confirm that long-term monitoring and aftercare are essential to effective reintegration and peacebuilding, consistent with current research.

Table 9 shows that respondents strongly agree with all indicators related to economic opportunities, with an overall weighted mean of 3.72 ($SD = 0.35$). This suggests that access to employment and livelihood support is a critical factor in reducing insurgency recidivism and facilitating the successful reintegration of former rebels under the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP).

Table 9. Level of Insurgency Recidivism as to Economic Opportunities

Indicators	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Interpretation
1. There are job opportunities available for reintegrated individuals.	3.84	0.40	Strongly Agree
2. I was assisted in finding employment or livelihood.	3.85	0.36	Strongly Agree
3. My current livelihood is sustainable.	3.66	0.76	Strongly Agree
4. The government facilitated connections with private employers or businesses.	3.59	0.72	Strongly Agree
5. I am satisfied with the available economic opportunities in my area.	3.67	0.66	Strongly Agree
Overall Weighted Mean	3.72	0.35	Strongly Agree

Legend: $n=87$. This means is interpreted as follows: 3.26-4.00 (Strongly Agree); 2.51-3.25 (Agree); 1.76-2.50 (Disagree); 1.00-1.75 (Strongly Disagree).

The two factors with the highest mean scores were the availability of job options for reintegrated individuals ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 0.40$) and support in finding employment or livelihood ($M = 3.85$, $SD = 0.36$). These results emphasize the significance of proactive program and government initiatives in connecting reintegrated people to employment prospects. This is consistent with research by Blattman et al. (2016), who highlighted that having access to steady work considerably lowers the risk of returning to armed combat. Similarly, the World Bank (2019) found that providing former combatants with livelihood options and private-sector involvement increases their economic self-reliance.

Even if they are marginally lower than others, indicators of current livelihood sustainability ($M = 3.66$, $SD = 0.76$) and contentment with available economic prospects ($M = 3.67$, $SD = 0.66$) nonetheless show strong agreement. This implies that there may be variation in income continuity and long-term viability even though respondents generally view their financial circumstances as steady. These findings are in line with Humphreys et al.'s (2016) study, which found that while sustainable livelihoods are essential for reducing recidivism, they also need ongoing support and monitoring to adjust to shifting market conditions.

Even though it is the lowest, the indicator of government facilitation of links with private jobs or firms ($M = 3.59$, $SD = 0.72$) nevertheless shows considerable agreement. This suggests that while attempts to connect reintegrated people with larger economic networks are acknowledged, they may be strengthened even further. The International Labour Organization (2020), which stressed that collaborations with local companies and the private sector are essential to enhancing long-term job outcomes for former fighters, supports this conclusion.

Overall, the results show that E-CLIP's economic prospects improve the livelihoods, income stability, and self-reliance of reintegrated people. The significance of ongoing government assistance, talent matching, and business-sector cooperation in reducing recidivism and fostering long-term reintegration is evident from strong agreement across all measures. These findings align with recent research highlighting the importance of economic empowerment in long-term post-conflict healing.

Table 10 shows that respondents strongly agree across all indicators related to insurgency recidivism, with an overall weighted mean of 3.79 ($SD = 0.31$). This indicates that the combined effect of financial and

livelihood assistance, psychosocial services, and economic opportunities under the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) effectively reduces the likelihood of former rebels returning to armed conflict.

Table 10. Overall Level of Insurgency Recidivism

Indicators	Mean	Rank	Interpretation
1. Community Acceptance	3.86	1	Very High
2. Monitoring and Aftercare Support	3.79	2	Very High
3. Economic Opportunities	3.72	3	Very High
Overall Weighted Mean	3.79		Very High

Legend: 3.26-4.00 Very High; 2.51-3.25 High; 1.76-2.50 Low; 1.00-1.75 Very Low

The total weighted mean of 3.79 in Table 10 indicates that the respondents strongly agreed that the factors impacting the reduction of insurgency recidivism were present in their areas. Community acceptance had the greatest mean (3.86) of all the measures, followed by monitoring and aftercare assistance (3.79). Economic opportunities had the lowest mean (3.72), although this was still considered to be strongly agree. These results show that social reintegration strategies are typically considered successful at preventing former rebels from engaging in insurgency again.

The highest ranking for community acceptance indicates that a major factor in maintaining reintegration is communities' readiness to embrace former rebels. Returnees are more likely to reestablish themselves as contributing members of society when they experience acceptance from their families and communities. This result corroborates the research of Ybañez et al. (2025), who discovered that rebel returnees' transition from armed conflict to peaceful civilian life was greatly aided by strong community ties and social belonging. Reconciliation and local acceptance are also crucial in keeping former rebels from joining insurgent groups, according to recent government reports on the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP).

The second-ranked factor, monitoring and aftercare support, indicates that effective reintegration is facilitated by ongoing follow-up by local stakeholders and government authorities. This suggests that, beyond the initial surrender process, former rebels require ongoing leadership. Research on reintegration programs has demonstrated that by assisting former fighters in acclimating to civilian life, frequent psychosocial support, monitoring, and institutional aid lowers the risk of recidivism. In the Philippines, E-CLIP aftercare services have been linked to better reintegration outcomes for former rebels across several areas. This demonstrates that reintegration requires long-term support networks in addition to financial assistance.

Even while economic prospects had the lowest mean, it was still in the "strongly agree" category, suggesting that livelihood is still a significant deterrent to recidivism. When former rebels find steady work or support for their livelihood, they feel more secure financially and are less likely to rejoin armed groups. According to recent reintegration reports, government-funded economic aid and skill development programs helped former rebels become independent and contributing members of society. By addressing one of the underlying causes of armed participation, the prospect of income-generating opportunities continuously lowers the appeal of returning to insurgent groups.

Overall, the results show that economic support, ongoing aftercare, and community acceptance all contribute to reducing insurgency recidivism, with social acceptance as the most significant factor. This suggests that successful reintegration requires not only government intervention but also active participation from communities in fostering inclusion and long-term peace.

3.3. Level of Local Peace and Security

The Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) and other reintegration

initiatives that reduce insurgency recidivism and foster a safer community environment are the main topics of discussion in local peace and security. This section emphasizes the importance of community-based, psychosocial, and economic interventions in averting a return to armed conflict by looking at the experiences of former rebels. Additionally, it examines how these interventions promote social cohesion, trust, and active citizen participation, which are critical to maintaining long-term local peace and security.

Table 11 indicates that respondents strongly agree with all indicators related to reducing insurgency recidivism, with an overall weighted mean of 3.92 ($SD = 0.11$). This suggests that local peace and security in the area have been significantly strengthened, largely due to effective reintegration programs, community participation, and active monitoring of former rebels. The high level of agreement across indicators reflects a noticeable decline in insurgent activities and a heightened sense of safety among community members.

The highest mean score among the indicators was found for former rebels participating in productive and peaceful community activities ($M = 3.94$, $SD = 0.23$). This was closely followed by the fact that the number of former rebels returning to insurgent activities has significantly decreased ($M = 3.93$, $SD = 0.25$) and that the existence of peace and development programs has reduced insurgent activities ($M = 3.93$, $SD = 0.25$).

Table 11. Level of Local Peace and Security as to Reduction of Insurgency Recidivism

Indicators	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Interpretation
1. The number of former rebels returning to insurgent activities has significantly decreased in our area.	3.93	0.25	Strongly Agree
2. Reintegration programs have successfully discouraged former rebels from rejoining armed groups.	3.90	0.31	Strongly Agree
3. Community members actively report and prevent possible recruitment by insurgent groups.	3.92	0.27	Strongly Agree
4. Local authorities and law enforcement monitor former rebels effectively to prevent recidivism.	3.92	0.27	Strongly Agree
5. The presence of peace and development programs has reduced insurgent activities.	3.93	0.25	Strongly Agree
6. Former rebels are now engaged in peaceful and productive community activities.	3.94	0.23	Strongly Agree
7. Cooperation between community members and local security forces helps prevent insurgency.	3.89	0.32	Strongly Agree
8. Fear of insurgent resurgence has lessened in the community.	3.93	0.25	Strongly Agree
Overall Weighted Mean	3.92	0.11	Strongly Agree

Legend: $n=87$. This means is interpreted as follows: 3.26-4.00 (Strongly Agree); 2.51-3.25 (Agree); 1.76-2.50 (Disagree); 1.00-1.75 (Strongly Disagree).

In line with the study by Kaplan et al. (2018), which found that focused reintegration interventions significantly reduce recidivism rates and improve social cohesion, these results underscore the importance of structured reintegration programs in guiding former combatants toward productive civilian roles. Similarly, Blattman et al. (2016) stressed that comprehensive support, including livelihood and psychosocial support,

reduces the likelihood that former soldiers will rejoin armed groups.

The relevance of community engagement in maintaining local peace is further shown by indicators such as community members actively reporting and stopping recruitment ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 0.27$) and collaboration between community members and local security personnel ($M = 3.89$, $SD = 0.32$). This is consistent with Söderström's (2016) findings, which highlighted that community-driven monitoring and cooperation with local authorities are essential for discouraging insurgent activity and strengthening public confidence in security services. Furthermore, ongoing community involvement in reporting and avoiding recruitment enhances the long-term efficacy of reintegration initiatives, according to the International Organization for Migration (2019).

Strong institutional backing and enhanced public perception of safety are shown in the indicators of local authorities and law enforcement effectively monitoring former rebels ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 0.27$) and the community's decreased fear of an insurgent revival ($M = 3.93$, $SD = 0.25$). This is in line with the conclusions of Humphreys et al. (2016), who emphasized that community collaboration and thorough law enforcement follow-up are crucial for preserving security and averting a return to insurgency.

Overall, the results show that local peace and security directly benefit from a decrease in insurgency recidivism. Effective reintegration programs, community involvement, and coordinated monitoring between authorities and residents are essential to maintaining a safe, stable, and resilient community, as demonstrated by the significant agreement across all indicators. These findings align with recent research highlighting the importance of comprehensive strategies that incorporate social, economic, and security considerations to prevent insurgent activity from resuming.

Table 12 indicates that respondents strongly agree with all indicators measuring improvements in local peace and security, with an overall weighted mean of 3.92 ($SD = 0.15$). This demonstrates that the community has experienced notable gains in safety, social cohesion, and trust between citizens and local authorities, reflecting the positive outcomes of reintegration and peacebuilding initiatives.

The two factors with the highest mean scores were the regularity of community-based peacebuilding activities ($M = 3.95$, $SD = 0.21$) and the contribution of residents' livelihood and economic stability to a peaceful community ($M = 3.95$, $SD = 0.21$). These results highlight the crucial role of economic growth and engaged citizen involvement in maintaining regional harmony. This is in line with Blattman et al.'s (2016) study, which highlighted how economic empowerment and community-driven initiatives lessen the incentives for criminal or insurgent behavior. Similarly, the International Organization for Migration (2019) emphasized that livelihood interventions and local peacebuilding strengthen resilience, trust, and cooperation in post-conflict communities. Improved social cohesiveness and institutional efficacy are demonstrated by indicators like increased trust and collaboration between residents and local law enforcement ($M = 3.94$, $SD = 0.23$) and peaceful coexistence between former rebels and community members ($M = 3.94$, $SD = 0.23$). These findings are consistent with those of Kaplan et al. (2018), who pointed out that collaborative security measures, inclusive policing, and community participation are essential for fostering social stability and averting a return to violence.

Table 12. Level of Local Peace and Security as to Improvement in Local Peace and Security

	Indicators	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Interpretation
1.	The overall peace and order situation in the community has improved in recent years.	3.91	0.29	Strongly Agree
2.	Residents feel safer in their homes and workplaces.	3.90	0.31	Strongly Agree
3.	There is greater trust and cooperation between citizens and local law enforcement agencies.	3.94	0.23	Strongly Agree

4. Incidents of violence, crime, or armed conflict have decreased.	3.84	0.57	Strongly Agree
5. Local peace and order councils are active in promoting community safety.	3.89	0.42	Strongly Agree
6. Community-based peacebuilding activities are regularly conducted.	3.95	0.21	Strongly Agree
7. The livelihood and economic stability of residents contribute to a peaceful community.	3.95	0.21	Strongly Agree
8. Former rebels and community members now coexist peacefully.	3.94	0.23	Strongly Agree
9. Youth engagement programs help prevent radicalization or insurgent recruitment.	3.91	0.29	Strongly Agree
10. There is a general sense of peace, unity, and progress in the community.	3.90	0.31	Strongly Agree
Overall Weighted Mean	3.92	0.15	Strongly Agree

Legend: $n=87$. This means is interpreted as follows: 3.26-4.00 (Strongly Agree); 2.51-3.25 (Agree); 1.76-2.50 (Disagree); 1.00-1.75 (Strongly Disagree).

Other indicators show that both the perception of safety and proactive preventive measures contribute to sustainable peace, such as residents feeling safer in their homes and workplaces ($M = 3.90$, $SD = 0.31$), a general sense of peace, unity, and progress ($M = 3.90$, $SD = 0.31$), and youth engagement programs preventing radicalization ($M = 3.91$, $SD = 0.29$). These results align with the United Nations Development Programme's (2018) emphasis that all-encompassing strategies, such as community safety programs, economic initiatives, and youth participation, build local peace and lower the likelihood of insurgent revival.

Overall, the results indicate that local peace and security have significantly increased due to the combined effects of reintegration programs, community involvement, economic stability, and law enforcement collaboration. A resilient and peaceful society is fostered by safety, social cohesiveness, and economic empowerment, as demonstrated by the significant agreement across all measures, which highlights the multifaceted character of peacebuilding.

Table 13 indicates that respondents strongly agree with both indicators measuring the overall level of local peace and security, with an overall weighted mean of 3.92. This demonstrates that the community has experienced significant improvements in safety, stability, and social cohesion, largely due to effective reintegration programs, proactive community engagement, and coordinated peacebuilding initiatives.

The Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) has been successful in fostering peaceful and productive livelihoods, as seen by the indicator on reduction of insurgency recidivism ($M = 3.92$), which shows that former rebels are less likely to return to armed conflict. This aligns with the findings of Kaplan et al. (2018), who found that community support and well-designed reintegration programs dramatically reduce recidivism rates and improve social cohesion.

Table 13. Overall Level of Local Peace and Security

Indicators	Mean	Rank	Interpretation
1. Reduction of Insurgency Recidivism	3.92	1.5	Very High
2. Improvement in Local Peace and Security	3.92	1.5	Very High
Overall Weighted Mean	3.92		Very High

Legend: 3.26-4.00 Very High; 2.51-3.25 High; 1.76-2.50 Low; 1.00-1.75 Very Low

Similarly, the indicator of improved local peace and security ($M = 3.92$) demonstrates that locals believe there have been noticeable improvements in general safety, communal harmony, and trust in local authorities. These results are consistent with the United Nations Development Programme's (2018) emphasis

that all-encompassing strategies that integrate security, social, and economic initiatives promote long-term local peace. The fact that both measures consistently show strong agreement underscores the importance of a multifaceted approach to preserving peace and averting the resurgence of violence.

Overall, the results point to a secure, resilient, and cohesive community, driven by the synergistic effect of lower insurgency recidivism and proactive reconciliation activities. This demonstrates that maintaining local peace and security requires comprehensive reintegration initiatives.

3.4. Relationship between Reintegration Factors and Insurgency Recidivism among Former Rebel Beneficiaries of E-CLIP

Table 14. Significant Relationship between Reintegration Factors and Insurgency Recidivism among Former Rebel Beneficiaries of E-CLIP

Reintegration Factors		Insurgency Recidivism		
		Community Acceptance	Effectiveness of Monitoring and Aftercare Support	Economic Opportunities
Financial and Livelihood Assistance	Pearson Correlation	-0.051	0.199	0.273*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.640	0.065	0.011
	N	87	87	87
Psychosocial Services	Pearson Correlation	0.019	0.327**	0.184
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.860	0.002	0.088
	N	87	87	87
Education and Training	Pearson Correlation	-0.003	0.227*	0.452**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.975	0.034	0.000
	N	87	87	87
Community Support	Pearson Correlation	-0.088	-0.040	-0.218*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.418	0.712	0.043
	N	87	87	87

***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*

Improved social cohesiveness and institutional efficacy are demonstrated by indicators like increased trust and collaboration between residents and local law enforcement ($M = 3.94$, $SD = 0.23$) and peaceful coexistence between former rebels and community members ($M = 3.94$, $SD = 0.23$). These findings are consistent with those of Kaplan et al. (2018), who pointed out that collaborative security measures, inclusive policing, and community participation are essential for fostering social stability and averting a return to violence.

Access to financial and livelihood support is linked to better economic outcomes for reintegrated individuals, which, in turn, lowers the risk of recidivism, as evidenced by a significant positive relationship between financial and livelihood assistance and economic opportunities ($r = 0.273$, $p = 0.011$). This is consistent with the findings of Blattman et al. (2016), who found that livelihood and financial empowerment initiatives boost economic independence and prevent former rebels from returning to fight.

The effectiveness of monitoring and aftercare support was highly correlated with psychosocial

services ($r = 0.327$, $p = 0.002$), indicating a close relationship between the success of ongoing follow-up programs and mental health support, counseling, and social reintegration initiatives. The World Health Organization's (2019) claim that psychosocial therapies increase resilience and lower the risk of relapse into violence is supported by this research.

The effectiveness of monitoring and aftercare support ($r = 0.227$, $p = 0.034$) and economic opportunities ($r = 0.452$, $p < 0.001$) were significantly positive correlated with education and training. These findings imply that educational assistance and skill development enhance employment and help sustain reintegration by enhancing aftercare systems. Education and vocational training improve long-term reintegration success and lower insurgency recidivism, according to Humphreys and Weinstein (2016).

It is interesting to note that there was a substantial negative correlation ($r = -0.218$, $p = 0.043$) between community support and economic opportunities. This could indicate a context in which strong community engagement reduces reliance on individual economic incentives as the sole determinant of reintegration. This is consistent with the findings of Kaplan et al. (2018), who observed that community involvement and social cohesiveness serve as preventive measures against recidivism, even in the face of economic circumstances.

Overall, the data show that, across the dimension considered, reintegration elements have varying effects on insurgency recidivism. Strong, favorable correlations between financial, psychological, and educational treatments and economic and monitoring outcomes demonstrate their crucial significance in long-term reintegration. In the meantime, community support appears to operate through relational and social mechanisms, underscoring the need for multifaceted strategies to effectively reduce insurgency recidivism.

3.5. Relationship between Reintegration Factors and Local Peace and Security in the Communities

Table 15 presents the correlation between four reintegration factors, such as financial and livelihood assistance, psychosocial services, education and training, and community support, and two outcome measures: reduction in insurgency recidivism and improvement in local peace and security among former rebel beneficiaries of the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP). The findings indicate small, non-significant relationships across all correlations, suggesting that within this sample ($N = 87$), these reintegration elements did not show a strong statistical association with reduced recidivism or improved peace outcomes.

Although this link was not statistically significant, the negative correlation between financial and livelihood help and insurgency recidivism ($r = -.184$, $p = .089$) shows a modest inverse association: tendencies toward recidivism decrease as access to financial support increases. Similarly, this dataset has little predictive value, as evidenced by the extremely weak negative correlation ($r = -.059$, $p = .588$) with increased local peace and security.

Table 15. Significant Relationship between Reintegration Factors and Local Peace and Security among Former Rebel Beneficiaries of E-CLIP

Reintegration Factors		Insurgency Recidivism	
		Reduction of Insurgency Recidivism	Improvement in Local Peace and Security
Financial and Livelihood Assistance	Pearson Correlation	-0.184	-0.059
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.089	0.588
	N	87	87
Psychosocial Services	Pearson Correlation	-0.199	-0.002
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.065	0.983
	N	87	87
Education and Training	Pearson Correlation	-0.131	0.023
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.228	0.830
	N	87	87
Community Support	Pearson Correlation	0.178	-0.052
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.099	0.634
	N	87	87

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

These results are somewhat consistent with earlier studies that emphasize the value of financial support for reintegration, but they also show that financial support may not be sufficient to achieve meaningful peace outcomes. For instance, Omolo (2019) found that while livelihood interventions for ex-insurgents in Kenya reduced economic vulnerability, they were insufficient to sustain long-term disengagement from militancy in the absence of supplementary social support networks.

Similarly, Mapedzahama et al. (2017) stressed that to achieve quantifiable reductions in recidivism, economic reintegration must be comprehensive, encompassing market access, mentorship, and continuous follow-up. Therefore, even while financial aid is still required, its independent impact is probably limited in isolation, as the current study's minimal connection supports.

Additionally, psychosocial services had a nearly null link with local peace and security ($r = -.002$, $p = .983$) and a slight negative correlation with insurgency recidivism ($r = -.199$, $p = .065$). The direction suggests that greater psychological support may be associated with slight reductions in recidivism, though this is not statistically significant.

This is consistent with research highlighting the psychosocial aspect of reintegration. Betancourt et al. (2018) found that when services addressed trauma, identity reconstruction, and stigma, access to counseling and mental health care among former fighters significantly contributed to decreased aggressiveness and social reintegration. Furthermore, Gormally et al. (2017) found that in post-conflict environments, psychosocial interventions were strongly associated with resilience and community acceptance; however, their impact on official measures of peace was mediated by variables like community receptivity and levels of ongoing violence. Because psychosocial support benefits individuals but may not immediately translate into broad community peace metrics without systemic community healing processes, the current study's negligible association with local peace outcomes may reflect the complexity of peace dynamics (Cavallin et al., 2020).

Both enhanced local peace and security ($r = .023$, $p = .830$) and insurgency recidivism ($r = -.131$, $p = .228$) showed weak correlations with education and training. These results show that the primary outcomes in this sample did not significantly correspond with educational achievement or skill training alone.

This result is consistent with research showing that, although education and training improve employability, their effects on recidivism and peace depend on contextual elements like job market capability, social capital, and persistent violence (Muggah et al., 2018). Vocational training decreased recidivism when combined with strong job placement and stigma-reduction techniques, according to a study on ex-militant rehabilitation in Nigeria by Uduak et al. (2021). However, it was less successful when participants experienced discrimination or had little economic absorption. Similarly, without accompanying frameworks for communal reconciliation, education alone was unable to guarantee peace gains in Sierra Leone (Wiysonge, 2019).

Both the small negative link with local peace and security ($r = -.052$, $p = .634$) and the slight positive correlation with insurgency recidivism ($r = .178$, $p = .099$) were not statistically significant. Despite being contradictory, the positive correlation with recidivism could be due to measurement uncertainty or an artifact of community dynamics, in which some supportive networks might unintentionally maintain connections to former organizations.

Unlike this study, most research emphasizes the importance of community support in reintegration and peacebuilding. For example, Chenoweth and Stephan (2016) found that community acceptance and empowerment initiatives considerably decreased the probability that former combatants would revert to violence again. Similarly, Hörnlein (2020) found that inclusive community programs promote local peace and civic participation, especially when communities actively participate in reintegration processes rather than passively receive them. According to Jordan et al. (2022), the above findings may suggest that community support alone is insufficient unless it is structured, meaningful, and peace-centric.

Overall, the study found no statistically significant relationship between the reintegration elements

under investigation and the outcome measures of local peace and security and insurgency recidivism. This implies that although financial aid, psychosocial services, education, and community support are crucial components of reintegration theory, their association with quantifiable reductions in recidivism and improvements in peace may depend on supplementary interventions and broader socio-structural factors. The literature now available emphasizes that, to achieve long-term reintegration and peacebuilding outcomes, multidimensional approaches combining economic, psychosocial, political, and communal strategies are often required.

3.6. Proposed Recommendations

Based on the study's findings, the researcher presents her proposed policy recommendations.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING THE ENHANCED COMPREHENSIVE LOCAL INTEGRATION PROGRAM (E-CLIP) IMPLEMENTATION

The Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) aims to improve local peace and security, reduce insurgent recidivism, and ensure sustainable reintegration of former rebels within a defined implementation period of 1–3 years per beneficiary cohort. Specifically, the program targets:

- Reduced recidivism rates by at least 30% within 3 years after program entry;
- Increased employment or sustainable livelihood engagement to at least 80% of beneficiaries within 12 months;
- Improve psychosocial well-being scores of beneficiaries by 50% within 6–12 months, based on standardized assessment tools;
- Achieve 90% community acceptance ratings within 2 years, measured through community perception surveys; and
- Ensure 100% of enrolled beneficiaries are monitored through a functional tracking system within the program duration

These goals are clear and measurable, targeting economic, psychological, and social vulnerabilities such as poverty, trauma, stigma, and lack of opportunities—factors closely associated with insurgent recidivism. To achieve these, E-CLIP shall implement a holistic reintegration framework combining economic support, psychosocial services, education, and community engagement, with clearly defined outputs and timelines.

To operationalize these strategies, the following program matrix illustrates specific interventions aligned with E-CLIP objectives:

Program/ Project Title	Description	Objectives/ Targets	Strategies/ Activities	Persons Involved	Source of Fund/ Estimated Cost	Target Date	Expected Outcome
Livelihood and Financial Assistance Program	Provide financial and livelihood support to ensure economic self-sufficiency of beneficiaries	- 80% of beneficiaries generating stable income - 30% reduction in economic-related recidivism	Financial grants, livelihood starter kits, skills matching, financial literacy training	DILG, LGUs, NGOs	Government budget; PHP 50,000 per beneficiary	Within 6 months after program entry	Increased income, reduced dependence on illegal activities
Vocational Education and Skills Training	Enhance employability through market-driven	- 75% training completion rate - 60% job	TESDA enrollment, skills training, internships,	DILG, TESDA, Training Centers, Private	Government budget; public-private partnership	6–12 months	Employment-ready beneficiaries; increased employment

	technical and vocational skills	placement within 12 months	on-the-job training	Sector	s		rate
Psychosocial Support and Counseling Program	Strengthen mental health and emotional resilience of beneficiaries reintegrating workshops	- 50% improvement in psychosocial assessment scores - 70% participation rate	Individual & group counseling, peer support, family reintegration sessions	DILG, LGUs, accredited psychologists, NGOs	Government budget, donor support	Continuous (quarterly assessments)	Improved mental health, reduced relapse into violence
Community Engagement and Peacebuilding Program	Promote social acceptance and community integration	- At least 4 community activities/year - 90% community acceptance rating	Community dialogues, volunteer projects, reconciliation ceremonies, mentorship programs	LGUs, Barangay officials, community organizations	Government budget, local contributions	Continuous (annual evaluation)	Strengthened community cohesion; increased acceptance
Monitoring and Evaluation System	Establish a data-driven system for tracking and improving program implementation	- 100% beneficiary profiling - Biannual assessment reports completed	Baseline surveys, periodic monitoring, feedback systems, data analytics	DILG, LGUs, research partners	Government budget	System operational within 6 months; continuous thereafter	Evidence-based decision-making; improved program efficiency
Inter-Agency Coordination and Stakeholder Collaboration	Strengthen partnerships for comprehensive and sustainable reintegration	- At least 4 inter-agency meetings/year - MOUs signed within 12 months	Coordination meetings, joint planning, stakeholder workshops, partnership agreements	DILG, LGUs, NGOs, civil society, local councils	Government budget	Initial setup within 12 months; continuous	Integrated service delivery; optimized resources; reduced recidivism

By combining these initiatives, E-CLIP operationalizes the holistic reintegration strategy, ensuring that former rebels receive comprehensive support to address their social, educational, psychological, and economic needs. Immediate financial stability is provided by financial and livelihood programs; long-term employability is increased through vocational training and education; mental health and resilience are addressed through psychosocial assistance; and social cohesion and acceptance are promoted through community involvement.

While inter-agency coordination improves implementation efficiency and sustainability, systematic monitoring and evaluation guarantee adaptive management of the program. When combined, these tactics should lower recidivism rates, improve local security and peace, and allow former rebels to reintegrate as contributing members of society.

4. Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

This chapter discusses the research problem, the study's respondents, and the statistical treatments applied to the investigation's data. Then it focuses on the summary of findings, conclusions, and recommendations

4.1. Summary of Findings

The following convey the results of the evaluation:

1. The study revealed that the overall level of reintegration factors under the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) is very high, with an overall weighted mean of 3.69, indicating strong agreement that the program effectively supports holistic reintegration across economic, psychosocial, educational, and community dimensions. This suggests that E-CLIP is highly effective in providing a comprehensive, multi-dimensional approach to reintegration that integrates all key support systems.

2. The study showed that respondents strongly agree that factors influencing the reduction of insurgency recidivism are highly present, with an overall weighted mean of 3.79, indicating a very high level. This suggests that community acceptance, monitoring and aftercare support, and economic opportunities collectively contribute to reducing recidivism, with social reintegration emerging as the most influential factor in sustaining peace and preventing return to armed conflict.

3. The results revealed that respondents strongly agree on the level of local peace and security, with an overall weighted mean of 3.92, indicating very high levels. This indicates that reintegration programs and peacebuilding efforts have contributed to improved safety, stability, and social cohesion in the community. Overall, the findings suggest that effective reintegration and coordinated community efforts have helped establish a secure, stable, and cohesive environment.

4. The results showed that reintegration factors have significant but varying relationships with insurgency recidivism among E-CLIP beneficiaries. Financial and livelihood assistance ($r = 0.273$, $p = 0.011$), psychosocial services ($r = 0.327$, $p = 0.002$), and education and training ($r = 0.227$, $p = 0.034$; $r = 0.452$, $p < 0.001$) are all significantly associated with key reintegration outcomes such as economic opportunities and monitoring and aftercare support. Meanwhile, community support shows a significant negative relationship with economic opportunities ($r = -0.218$, $p = 0.043$). Overall, the results indicate that reintegration is shaped by a combination of economic, psychosocial, educational, and social factors that collectively influence insurgency recidivism.

5. The results revealed that reintegration factors have weak and mostly non-significant relationships with both the reduction of insurgency recidivism and the improvement in local peace and security among E-CLIP beneficiaries. Financial and livelihood assistance, psychosocial services, education and training, and community support all showed very low correlations with peace and security outcomes in this sample ($N = 87$), indicating limited direct statistical association.

Although a few indicators showed slight positive or negative tendencies (e.g., financial support with recidivism $r = -0.184$; education and training with peace $r = 0.023$), none were statistically significant. Overall, the findings suggest that reintegration factors alone do not have a strong measurable impact on local peace and security outcomes, implying that broader socio-structural and contextual factors may be necessary to produce significant improvements.

6. The Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP), which addresses community-based, educational, psychological, and economic requirements, has helped former rebel beneficiaries reintegrate. While community support strengthened social acceptance and cohesion, financial and livelihood aid, psychosocial services, and access to education and training were found to facilitate reintegration, improve employability, and lessen vulnerabilities to re-recruitment. Nevertheless, the analysis also shows that the impacts of these reintegration measures on lowering insurgent recidivism and enhancing local peace and security vary by context, and in many instances, their effects are not statistically significant when considered separately.

4.2. Conclusions

From the statement of the problem of this study and based on the foregoing findings, the following

conclusions were drawn:

1. The Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP), which emphasizes community support, education and training, financial aid, and psychosocial services, is highly effective in promoting the complete reintegration of former rebels. While education and training enhance skills, employment, and long-term independence, community involvement plays a vital role in sustaining reintegration, fostering social acceptance, and reducing stigma. Both immediate financial needs and emotional well-being are addressed through financial and livelihood assistance as well as psychosocial support, which are essential elements of successful reintegration.

2. Financial, psychosocial, and employment-related treatments are crucial elements of the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP), which effectively supports former rebels in disengaging from armed conflict. Long-term reintegration successes are reinforced by continued access to economic opportunities, while financial and livelihood support appears to have a particularly significant impact on reducing the risk of recidivism. By attending to the emotional and psychological needs of former combatants, psychosocial support enhances these interventions. Therefore, a coordinated, multifaceted approach that incorporates financial stability, job access, and psychosocial care is necessary for successful reintegration and the decrease of insurgency recidivism.

3. It is also concluded that by simultaneously reducing insurgency recidivism and enhancing social cohesion, E-CLIP has successfully promoted local peace and security. Overall safety, community harmony, and trust in local authorities have all significantly improved due to effective reintegration programs, community involvement, and coordinated reconciliation efforts. A comprehensive approach that integrates social, economic, and security initiatives is essential to sustain local peace and security, demonstrating that long-term stability is achievable when reintegration efforts are comprehensive, community-centered, and well-coordinated.

4. The study shows that reintegration factors under the E-CLIP significantly affect insurgency recidivism among former rebel beneficiaries. Economic assistance, psychosocial services, and education and training are all strongly linked to better economic stability and improved monitoring and aftercare results, emphasizing their role in maintaining successful reintegration. Community support, although displaying a different pattern of association, remains vital as it highlights the importance of social cohesion and relationships in preventing a return to armed conflict. Because several reintegration variables have significant relationships with recidivism outcomes, the null hypothesis stating there is no significant relationship between reintegration factors and insurgency recidivism is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis is accepted.

5. The study found that reintegration factors such as financial and livelihood assistance, psychosocial services, education and training, and community support do not show statistically significant relationships with local peace and security or insurgency recidivism among the respondents. This indicates that no single reintegration component can, on its own, produce measurable improvements in peace outcomes or reductions in recidivism within the sample. As a result, the null hypothesis stating that there is no significant relationship between reintegration factors, insurgent recidivism, and local peace and security is accepted. Overall, the findings suggest that sustainable reintegration and peacebuilding are best achieved through integrated and multidimensional approaches rather than isolated interventions.

6. The study concludes that although E-CLIP has been successful in helping former rebels reintegrate, lowering recidivism, and improving local peace, no single reintegration factor by itself ensures quantifiable gains in these outcomes. Financial, emotional, educational, and community-based interventions all play a role in the process, but when applied in a coordinated, comprehensive way, their efficacy is maximized. As a result, measures that address only one aspect, such as financial assistance or career training, may not be sufficient. Thus, systemic integration of various treatments, proactive community engagement, and ongoing monitoring to guarantee that reintegration results in long-term peace and security are essential to the program's long-term success.

4.3. Recommendations

In light of the foregoing findings and conclusions of the study, the following recommendations are strongly presented:

1. To the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), Local Government Units (LGUs), and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), these agencies should expand skills development programs by increasing TESDA-accredited training slots by at least 30% annually. All beneficiaries must enroll in training within 3 months, with courses aligned with local labor market demands. LGUs should also establish partnerships with at least five employers per province to achieve at least 60% job placement within 12 months.

2. To the DILG, LGUs, and partner implementing agencies, financial and livelihood assistance should be released within 30 days of enrollment to ensure timely support. LGUs must promote sustainable livelihood initiatives and provide at least 12 months of post-assistance monitoring. These efforts should ensure that at least 80% of beneficiaries maintain stable incomes within 6 to 12 months.

3. To the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), LGUs, and accredited mental health professionals, psychosocial services should be institutionalized as a core component of E-CLIP implementation. Beneficiaries must receive quarterly counseling, biannual mental health assessments, and family reintegration sessions within six months. At least 70% of beneficiaries should complete structured interventions within one year to strengthen resilience and reduce recidivism.

4. To LGUs, Barangay Officials, and Community-Based Organizations, community engagement efforts should be strengthened to foster social cohesion and acceptance. These groups need to carry out at least four structured activities each year, such as dialogues and reconciliation initiatives. Mentorship programs should also be launched to reach at least 90% community acceptance within two years.

5. To the DILG, LGUs, and Research and Planning Units, a centralized digital monitoring system should be developed within six months to track all beneficiaries. This system must guarantee 100% profiling, with baseline data and biannual assessments regularly conducted. Annual evaluation reports should inform program improvements and policy adjustments.

6. To National Government Agencies (DILG, TESDA, DOLE, DSWD), for LGUs and Civil Society Organizations, an inter-agency coordinating committee should be established at the provincial level to enhance collaboration. The committee must hold quarterly meetings and develop joint plans supported by formal agreements within one year. This will promote integrated service delivery and optimal resource use.

7. To policymakers and program designers at the national and regional levels, a standardized reintegration framework should be adopted to incorporate economic, psychosocial, educational, and community interventions. Each beneficiary must have a tailored reintegration plan within 60 days of enrollment. This approach will support long-term reintegration and help reduce insurgent recidivism.

8. To future researchers, academic institutions, and policy research organizations, researchers should carry out longitudinal studies lasting three to five years to evaluate long-term reintegration outcomes. Comparative studies should assess the effectiveness of various interventions, including livelihood, employment, and psychosocial strategies. These studies will enhance the evidence base for bettering E-CLIP implementation.

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